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COMPACTS, CONFEDERACIES, AND COMITY:
INTERTRIBAL ENFORCEMENT OF TRIBAL
COURT ORDERS
STEVEN J. GUNN*
INTRODUCTION
Indian tribes and their reservations have been described as America's internal
colonies. Since the arrival of Europeans on this continent, Indian people have seen
their tribes divided, their lands taken, and their sovereignty diminished. For well
over a century, the U.S. Congress has exercised so-called "plenary power" over
Indian affairs, enacting legislation, without tribal consent, that has fundamentally
altered the nature of tribal landholdings and the organization and powers of tribal
governments. In its darkest moments, Congress has abrogated Indian treaties,
divided reservations into farm-sized allotments for individual Indians, sold surplus
Indian lands to homesteaders, acculturated Indian children in off-reservation
boarding schools, suppressed Indian cultural and religious practices, imposed federal
and, in some cases, state law on reservations, and terminated altogether the
government's recognition of, and trust relationship with, over one-hundred Indian
tribes.1
Although these policies have given way by and large in the last four decades to
an era of "self-determination," in which the political branches of government have
sought to strengthen reorganized tribal governments,2 Indian tribes have continued
to lose ground. Their chief nemesis is the Supreme Court, which, through its modern
cases, has breathed life into Congress's long-since repudiated policies of allotment
and assimilation. In a string of cases dating back to the 1970s, the Court has found
Indian reservations to be diminished or disestablished and the inherent powers of
tribal governments to be limited, in all but the most extraordinary cases, to tribal
members and their activities only.3 The Court's decisions concerning the nature and
scope of tribal governmental authority are particularly damaging, for they eviscerate
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. J.D., 1995, Yale Law School; A.B.,
1992, Stanford University. This article was originally presented at the New Mexico Law Review Symposium entitled
"Enforcing the Judgments of Tribal Courts" on March 6, 2004. The author would like to thank the New Mexico Law
Review for its support, dedication, and hard work in marshaling this piece from draft to print. The author would also
like to thank the symposium participants and his colleagues at the Washington University School of Law for their
insightful comments and suggestions.
1. Concise histories of these events can be found in ROGER L. NICHOLS, AMERICAN INDIANS IN U.S.
HISTORY (2003); ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OFTHE INDIANS OFTHE UNITED STATES (1970); and WILLIAM T. HAGAN,
AMERICAN INDIANS (Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1961). More detailed accounts can be found in HISTORY OF INDIAN-
WHITE RELATIONS (William C. Sturtevant et al. eds., 1988) and FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984). Thoughtful discussions of federal Indian law
and policy can be found, among other places, in FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982), a complete revision of which is forthcoming, and in the two leading casebooks on
federal Indian law: ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (4th ed. 2003) and DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw (4th ed.
1998).
2. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n
(2004).
3. Philip P. Frickey describes and masterfully analyzes these cases in A Common Law for Our Age of
Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999). The
cases are also discussed in this Article, infra, at notes 113-172 and in the accompanying text.
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any notion that tribes have jurisdiction to regulate all persons and activities within
their territories. Without full territorial sovereignty, tribes are increasingly unable
to enact legislation or to adjudicate disputes concerning the activities of non-tribal
members, including non-Indians and Indians who are members of other tribes.
No aspect of tribal governance is immune from the erosion of tribal jurisdiction
over nonmembers. Even the authority of tribes to recognize and enforce the orders
and judgments of other tribal courts is at stake. Such authority is vital, for it allows
tribes to unite in the formation of reciprocal cross-boundary regimes in which the
orders of each tribe are given effect within the territories of every other tribe, thus
extending the reach of each tribe's judicial power. Ordinarily, in the absence of such
efforts, tribal court orders have no legal effect beyond the reservation limits of the
issuing court. Yet, the authority of tribes to enforce the orders of other tribal courts
is predicated on the adjudicative jurisdiction of the enforcing court over the persons
or entities against which enforcement is sought. More often than not, in intertribal
cases, enforcement is sought in the courts of one tribe against the member or
members of another. Without complete jurisdiction over nonmembers, tribal courts
find themselves increasingly unable to enforce the orders of other tribal courts.
This Article examines these issues, and others, and suggests two ways in which
tribes can reassert their inherent authority over nonmembers and, in so doing, build
the framework for effective intertribal enforcement of tribal court orders. The
Article proceeds in five parts. Part I addresses the applicability, or inapplicability,
to Indian tribes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing legislation,
the Full Faith and Credit Act. Part II describes various approaches taken by tribes
in the enforcement of foreign orders, including the orders of other tribal courts. Part
III describes the limitations imposed by federal law on the ability of tribes fully to
enforce the judgments of other tribal courts, namely the diminishment of Indian
tribal authority over nonmembers.'
The final two parts of the Article suggest two alternate models for the resolution
of some, but admittedly not all, of the jurisdictional dilemmas concerning intertribal
enforcement of tribal court orders. First, part IV discusses the formation of
intertribal governing bodies linking historically united or allied tribes and suggests
that such bodies, if formed, would have the potential to broaden the jurisdictional
reach of each of their constituent tribal governments, in much the same way that the
union of the various states under a single federal government has broadened the
reach and enforceability of each state's laws.5 Second, part V proposes the
enactment of intertribal compacts providing for both the reciprocal delegation of
tribal jurisdiction between tribes and the reciprocal enforcement of tribal court
orders based on principles of comity. The merits of each of these proposals will be
addressed.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the focus of this Article, unlike that of the
other articles in this symposium edition of the New Mexico Law Review, is the
enforcement by tribes of the court orders and judgments of other tribes. To date,
4. This part also considers the extent to which Congress may authorize tribes to exercise jurisdiction over
cross-boundary disputes, and the pitfalls of such an approach.
5. The formation of intertriba governing bodies involves a substantial relinquishment of independence by
constituent tribes and is therefore appropriate only in select cases.
[Vol. 34
INTERTRIBAL ENFORCEMENT
little has been written on this subject. Instead, the scholarly debate has centered on
the relationships between tribes and states and the legal and political considerations
attendant to tribal-state cross-jurisdictional enforcement regimes.6 This Article's
discussion of intertribal enforcement of tribal court orders draws from that debate,
but its chief purpose is to address the unique inter-jurisdictional issues facing tribes
as they seek to recognize and enforce the judgments of other tribal courts.
I. THE APPLICABILITY OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
TO INDIAN TRIBES
Any discussion of the manner in which American Indian tribes may recognize
and enforce the court orders and judgments of other sovereigns,' including the
orders of other tribal governments, must begin with an assessment of the applicabil-
ity to Indian tribes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,' and its primary implement-
ing legislation, the Full Faith and Credit Act.9 Together, the Clause and the Act
require all states, territories, and possessions of the United States, with few
6. See, e.g., Melissa L Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary: Challenges Facing Tribal Governments in
Implementing the Full Faith and Credit Provisions of the Violence Against Women Acts, 90 KY. LJ. 123 (2001-02);
Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76
N.D. L. REV. 311 (2000); Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 861
(2000); Shelly Grunsted, Full Faith and Credit: Are Oklahoma Tribal Courts Finally Getting the Respect They
Deserve?, 36 TULSA LJ. 381 (2000); Barbara Ann Atwood, Identity and Assimilation: Changing Definitions of
Tribal Power over Children, 83 MINN. L REV. 927 (1999); Robert Laurence, Full Faith and Credit in Tribal
Courts: An Essay on Tribal Sovereignty, Cross-Boundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely Case of Eberhard v.
Eberhard, 28 N.M. L. REV. 19 (1998); Robert Laurence, The Convergence of Cross-Boundary Enforcement Theories
in American Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile Full Faith and Credit, Comity and Asymmetry, 18 QUINN1PIAC
L. REV. 115 (1998); Robert Laurence, The Off-Reservation Garnishment of an On-Reservation Debt and Related
Issues in the Cross-Boundary Enforcement of Money Judgments, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 355 (1998); B.J. Jones,
Welcoming Tribal Courts intothe Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court
Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L REV. 457 (1998); Daina B. Garonzik, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts from a
Federal Perspective: A Proposed Amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 45 EMORY L.J. 723 (1996); P.S.
Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topology of the
Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365 (1994); B.J. Jones, Tribal Considerations in Comity
and Full Faith and Credit, 68 N.D. L REV. 689 (1992), Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union,
26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841 (1990); William V. Vetter, Of Tribal Courts and "Territories": Is Full Faith and
Credit Required?, 23 CAL. W. L REV. 219 (1987); Gordon K. Wright, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State
Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397 (1985); John T. Moshier, Comment, Conflicts Between State and Tribal Law: The
Application of Full Faith and Credit Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 801; Note, The Application
of Full Faith and Credit to Indian Nations, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 1064 (1978); Fred L Ragsdale, Problems in the
Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REV. 133 (1977).
7. The principle concern of this Article is the recognition and enforcement between tribes of judicial
decrees, not the recognition or respect one tribe may give to the positive laws of another. With respect to judicial
decrees, it is worth noting that recognition and enforcement are separate and distinct acts:
The judgment of a foreign state may not be enforced unless it is entitled to recognition. Whether
a foreign judgment should be recognized, may be in issue, however, not only in enforcement
... but in other contexts, for example where the defendant seeks to rely on a prior adjudication
of a controversy (res judicata), or where either side in a litigation seeks to rely on prior
determination of an issue of fact or law. A proceeding to enforce a foreign judgment normally
takes the form of an action by the judgment creditor to collect a sum due from the judgment
debtor under a judgment rendered in another state.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. b (2003).
8. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
9. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, amended by Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298. The
Act is codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). Congress has also exercised its authority to implement the
Full Faith and Credit Clause in subsequent legislation, discussed infra at notes 30-32.
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exceptions, to recognize and enforce as their own the court judgments and orders of
every other state, territory, and possession. Simply put, the final judgment of any
state, territory, or possession "if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over
the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition
throughout the land."1° If tribes are treated as states, territories, or possessions within
the meaning of these laws, they ought to have no discretion in determining whether
they ought to enforce the orders of their sister tribal courts. If, however, tribes are
not included within the ambit of the federal full faith and credit mandate, they ought
to have considerable, if not unlimited, discretion in deciding whether or not, and in
what manner, they will enforce sister tribal court judgments.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not, by its terms,
apply to Indian tribes. The text of the clause speaks only of states. It provides, "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."1
The Framers intended the clause to:
alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each
free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings
of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout
which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right,
irrespective of the state of its origin. 2
Indian tribes were not included in this constitutional formulation. Indians and Indian
tribes are mentioned only three times in the Constitution. Article I gives Congress
the power to regulate commerce "with the Indian Tribes," 3 and further provides that
"Indians not taxed" are not to be counted in apportioning seats in the House of
Representatives among the states. 14 The Fourteenth Amendment repeats the latter
command.' 5 Nothing in the Constitution provides that tribes are to be treated as
states. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held time and again that Indian tribes are not
states.' 6 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court found that "the relation of the
Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which
exist no where else."' 7 Tribes, the Court held, are neither states of the Union nor
,,18foreign nations, but "domestic dependent nations. Tribes are politically
10. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
12. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935); accord, Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334
U.S. 343, 355 (1948) (holding that "[t]he full faith and credit clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the
Constitution by its framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a
nation").
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
16. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
597 (1963) ("An Indian Reservation is not a State."); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143
(1980) ("Tribal reservations are not States....").
17. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 26.
18. Id. at 26-27.
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dependent, in some sense, on the United States, but not "dependent on," "subordi-
nate to," 19 or equal in status to the states.
The Full Faith and Credit Act extends the application of the full faith and credit
doctrine to the territories and possessions of the United States. It states in relevant
part that:
[t]he records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory
or Possession... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage
in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.2"
There is disagreement among the federal, state, and tribal courts as to whether tribes
constitute "Territories" within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Act. How-
ever, as will be seen, the prevailing view is that tribes are not territories, and,
therefore, they are not included within the federal full faith and credit mandate.
A. Federal Court Views
The U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the question of whether
or not tribes constitute "Territories" under the Full Faith and Credit Act. The Court
ruled in the mid-nineteenth century that tribes are territories within the meaning of
a federal probate statute2' but later cited with approval a lower federal court case
holding that tribes are not territories within the meaning of a federal extradition
statute. When discussing the force of tribal court judgments, the Court has been
careful to emphasize the limited reach of its precedents: "Judgments of tribal courts,
as to matters properly within their jurisdiction, have been regarded in some
circumstances as entitled to full faith and credit in other courts.
23
The lower federal courts are split as to the applicability of the Full Faith and
Credit Act to Indian tribes. In several late nineteenth century cases, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the judgments of Indian tribes "are on the
19. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
21. United States ex reL Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 102 (1855). The statute in question
required the courts of the District of Columbia to recognize letters of administration issued by any state or territory.
It stated that:
it shall be unlawful for any person or persons to whom letters testamentary or of administration
hath been or may hereafter be granted, by the proper authority in any of the United States or
territories thereof, to maintain any suit or action, and to prosecute and recover any claim in the
District of Columbia, in the same manner as if the letters of testamentary or administration had
been granted... in the said District.
12 Cong. ch. 106, 2 Stat. 755 (1812). It is noteworthy that this statute did not use the term "full faith and credit" and
it did not impose a reciprocal requirement on the states or territories to acknowledge the probate letters of the
District.
22. New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468,474-75 (1909) (citing Exparte Morgan, 20 F. 298,
305 (W.D. Ark. 1883)). The extradition statute at issue in Exparte Morgan provided that:
[w]henever the executive authority of any state or territory demands any person as a fugitive
from justice... it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which such
person has fled, to cause him to be arrested and secured.. and to cause the fugitive to be
delivered....
Kopel, 211 U.S. at 472-73 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3182).
23. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,65-66 n.21 (1978) (citing Mackey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100)
(emphasis added).
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same footing with the proceedings and judgments of the courts of the territories of
the Union, and are entitled to full faith and credit." 24 Citing the Eighth Circuit's
precedents, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has ruled that Indian tribes
are territories within the meaning of a similar statute, the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act, which requires the courts of the states, territories, and possessions
of the United States to give full faith and credit to each other's custody decrees.25
However, more recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Wilson
v. Marchington26 that Congress did not intend to include Indian tribes within the
definition of the terms "territories or possessions," as used in the Full Faith and
Credit Act.27 Accordingly, federal and state courts need not accord full faith and
credit to the judgments of tribal courts. Likewise, tribes need not accord full faith
and credit to state court judgments or the judgments of sister tribal courts.2"
For the Ninth Circuit in Wilson, "the decisive factor" was Congress's "enactment
of subsequent statutes which expressly extended full faith and credit to certain tribal
proceedings. 29 Indeed, Congress has adopted seven full faith and credit statutes that
expressly include Indian tribes within their coverage: the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 30 the Violence Against Women Act,3' the Federal Full Faith and Credit for
Child Support Orders Act,32 the Indian Land Consolidation Act,33 the National
Indian Forest Resources Management Act,34 the American Indian Agricultural
Resource Management Act,35 and the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act. 36
According to the court:
If full faith and credit had already been extended to Indian tribes, enactment of
the Indian Land Consolidation Act, the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, and
24. Mehlin v. Ice, 56 F. 12, 19 (8th Cir. 1893); see also Exendine v. Pore, 56 F. 777 (8th Cir. 1893); Standley
v. Roberts, 59 F. 836 (8th Cir. 1894); Comells v. Shannon, 63 F. 305, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1894); accord, Iron Crow
v. Ogallala Sioux Tribe, 129 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.S.D. 1955) (finding that "[clourts have uniformly held that the
decisions of Indian tribal courts, rendered within their jurisdiction, territorial and personal, and according to the
forms of law recognized by the tribe, are entitled to full faith and credit").
25. In re Larch, 872 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1989). The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1738A (2000), provides, in relevant part, that "[tihe appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according
to its terms...any custody determination or visitation determination made consistently with the provisions of this
section by a court of another State." 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a). The Act defines the term "State" to include "a territory
or possession of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(8).
26. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
27. Id. at 809.
28. The district court for the District of New Mexico has affirmed this principle, ruling that "Indian tribes
are not states,... territories or possessions within the meaning of Section 1738A, therefore, the Navajo Courts are
not required to give full faith and credit to [a] Mescalero Tribal Order." Platero v. Platero, No. 83-0952 (D.N.M.
Sept. 22, 1983), quoted in Anderson Petroleum Servs., Inc. v. Chuska Energy & Petroleum Co., 4 Navajo Rptr. 187
(Navajo D. Ct. 1983); infra note 46.
29. 127 F.3d at 809.
30. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2000).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2000).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2000).
33. 25 U.S.C. § 2207 (2000).
34. 25 U.S.C. § 3106(2000).
35. 25 U.S.C. § 3713 (2000).
36. 25 U.S.C. § 1725(g) (2000). In addition, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act extends full faith
and credit to tribal court alimony and support orders. See Official Homepage of National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, at http://www.nccusl.org (Final Acts and Legislation) (last visited Sept.
5, 2004).
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the Indian Child Welfare Act would not have been necessary. Further, the
separate listing of territories, possessions and Indian tribes in the Indian Child
Welfare Act provides an indication that Congress did not view these terms as
synonymous. Thus, we conclude that Congress did not extend full faith and
credit to the tribes under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 7
In the absence of a federal mandate to apply full faith and credit in Indian country,
the Ninth Circuit held that "the enforcement of tribal court judgments in federal
court must inevitably rest on the principles of comity.' '38 According to the court:
Comity "is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere
courtesy and good will, upon the other." As a general policy, "comity should be
withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the
interest of the nation called upon to give it effect." At its core, comity involves
a balancing of interests. "It is the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."39
B. State and Tribal Views
The majority of the state and tribal courts that have considered the question have
concluded that Indian tribes do not constitute "Territories" or "Possessions" within
the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Act. As for the states, only two-Idaho and
New Mexico-have held that the term "Territories," as used in the Full Faith and
Credit Act, is "broad enough to include Indian tribes." In these states, the
judgments of tribal courts must be accorded full faith and credit by state courts, and
vice versa. However, most states decline to accord full faith and credit to tribal court
judgments, except when required to do so by federal law.4 Indeed, a "majority of
state courts that have considered the question have opted for comity,"42 finding that
tribes are not territories for the purposes of full faith and credit.43
37. 127 F.3d at 809.
38. Id.; see also Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop.. Inc., 255 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
39. 127 F.3d at 809-10 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); Somportex Ltd. v.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971)) (internal citations omitted).
40. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982); Jim v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751,
752 (N.M. 1975) (holding that "the laws of the Navajo Tribe of Indians are entitled by Federal Law, 28 U.S.C. §
1738, to full faith and credit in the courts of New Mexico because the Navajo Nation is a 'territory' within the
meaning of that statute"). Similarly, the supreme court of Washington has held that "[t]ribal court decrees are
entitled to full faith and credit to the same extent as decrees of sister states." In re Adoption of Buehl, 555 P.2d
1334, 1342 (Wash. 1976). The Washington high court has since retreated from that position, adopting a court rule
that allows state courts to exercise discretion in deciding whether or not to enforce tribal court judgments. WASH.
SUPER. CT. R. 82.5 (adopted 1995).
41. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
42. CLINTON Er AL., supra note I, at 294 (citing John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999)); Mexican v.
Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737 (S.D. 1985)); see also FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERs: AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LFE 89 (1995).
43. See, e.g., Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the "word
'territory' as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 was not intended to apply to [Indian tribal governments]"); Desjarlait v.
Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that Full Faith and Credit Clause applies only to
states, not tribes); Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430,433 (N.D. 1977) (same); Fredericks v. Edie-Kirschmann Ford,
462 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990) (same). Numerous states have, by case law, statute, or court rule, expressly adopted
comity as their policy for the recognition and enforcement of tribal court decisions. Among these states are Arizona,
Spring 2004]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
Like their state court counterparts, most tribal courts have concluded that the full
faith and credit doctrine is not applicable in Indian country. The Navajo Nation
Court of Appeals articulated the prevailing tribal view when it stated that Indian
tribes "stand beyond the bounds of [the] rule of [full faith and credit], such as it
presently exists and governs the constitutional relation ships [sic] of the states of the
United States."" The court stated:
It should not be necessary for this court to remind anyone that Indian nations and
tribes were not signatories to the United States Constitution and were not
intended to be included within the scope of the mandate of Article IV, Section
1. Nor does Title 28, United States Code, Section 1738, which was written to
effectuate the mandate of Article IV, Section 1, provide a clear guide to the rela-
tionship between Indian courts .... It is our opinion that 28 U.S.C. 1738 does not
purport to govern the relationship between Indian courts. The constitutional
provision upon which it is based did not envision Indian courts being in
existence nor did the act itself.45
Like other tribal courts, the Navajo Nation Court of Appeals has held that full
faith and credit is not applicable to the relationship between the tribes and the states
or to "the relationship between courts of different Indian Tribes. 4 6 The practice of
according full faith and credit to foreign orders is inconsistent with the Navajo
Nation's conception of its own sovereignty and that of other tribes, which sovereign-
ty contemplates "the exclusive jurisdiction of each Indian court over certain
matters. 47
At least one tribal court, however, has stated, albeit in dicta, that Indian tribes are
territories within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Act. In Eberhard v.
Eberhard,48 the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Court of Appeals considered the
applicability to Indian tribes of the full faith and credit provisions of the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). Like the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, the tribal appellate court found that Indian tribes are included within the
Act's coverage, and, as such, they must accord full faith and credit to valid child
custody decrees of state courts and other tribal courts.4 9 The court based its ruling
primarily on its review of the legislative history of the PKPA, which the court found
Connecticut, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Leeds, supra note 6, at 338-45.
44. In re Guardianship of Chewiwi, I Navajo Rptr. 120, 125 (Navajo 1977).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 121; accord, Yazza v. Smith, No. SC-CV-21-99 (Navajo 2001) (applying principles of comity, not
full faith and credit, to enforcement of state court order); Rough Rock Community School v. Navajo Nation, No.
SC-CV-06-94 (Navajo 1996) (same); Anderson Petroleum Servs., Inc. v. Chuska Energy & Petroleum Co., 4 Navajo
Rptr. 187 (Navajo D. Ct. 1983) (same); Husband v. Wife, No. MPCA-2001-1065 (Mashantucket Ct. App. 2003)
(rejecting full faith and credit as mechanism for tribal court enforcement of state court judgments in favor of "the
far more flexible construct of 'comity'); Smith v. Scott, No. MPTC-CV-2002-182 (Mashantucket Tribal Ct. 2003)
(same). Each of the above decisions is available on Versuslaw at http://versuslaw.com (Tribal Courts). Durango
Credit & Collection v. Weaver, No. 97-CV-13 (So. Ute Tribal Ct. Oct. 17, 1997) (holding that "the 'full faith and
credit clause' of the federal Constitution is not applicable to Indian tribes"), cited in Leeds, supra note 6, at 318,
n.27.
47. In re Guardianship of Chewiwi, I Navajo Rptr. at 125.
48. 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Ct. App. 1997). This case is reprinted in part in
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 1, at 269-83.
49. 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6066.
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evinced a clear congressional intent to include Indian tribes within the Act's
coverage.5 ° However, the court also expressed its view that, when Congress passed
the Full Faith and Credit Act in 1790, it intended to include tribes within the Act's
designation of all "courts within the United States and its Territories and Posses-
sions."'" The court stated:
Congress and the courts have long addressed the question of full faith and credit
in an effort to integrate first the states and, later, the tribes, territories, and
possessions, into a national union with reciprocal full faith and credit recognition
of judgments and laws. In 1790 Congress passed the Full Faith and Credit
Act... wich [sic] required "courts within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions" to recognize and enforce the records and judicial proceedings "of
any court of such State, Territory, or Possession...." [T]he Supreme Court has
long understood references to courts of states or territories, as used in such full
faith and credit legislation, to mean courts geographically located within such
states or territories, not as courts created under the sovereign political authority
of such states or territories.... It is therefore apparent.. that when Congress in full
faith and credit legislation refers to courts of the states, territories, and possess-
ions, that the reference is to a geographic, rather than a political designation.
... Consequently, since Indian lands are located within states and territories.. full
faith and credit statutes applicable to courts of the states, territories, or posses-
sions apply to Indian tribes.52
As noted above, the views of the Eberhard court are in the minority among Indian
tribes.53
In sum, full faith and credit is the mechanism employed to enforce court orders
and judgments between and among the states, territories, and possessions of the
United States. The doctrine does not apply to Indian tribes, since tribes are not states
and since, under prevailing federal, state, and tribal case law, they are not "Territo-
ries," as described in the Full Faith and Credit Act. Instead, various federal, state,
and tribal courts have held that, except in those subject matter areas where federal
law expressly includes Indian tribes within the full faith and credit mandate,54 tribes
may use comity as the mechanism for enforcing the judgments of foreign courts.
Unlike full faith and credit, comity is a discretionary mechanism that prescribes
enforcement of foreign orders only in certain circumstances. Based on the nature of
the relationships of tribal governments to the federal and state governments, and the
nature of intertribal relations, the tribal preference for comity over full faith and
credit is both logical and beneficial. It is to that preference that we now turn.
50. Id. at 6062-66.
51. Id. at 6064.
52. Id. at 6064-65.
53. See Part IL infra, for a discussion of the various approaches taken by tribes regarding the recognition
and enforcement of foreign orders.
54. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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IU. TRIBAL APPROACHES TO THE ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN ORDERS
Indian tribes must confront numerous political and legal issues in determining
whether or not to enforce the court orders and judgments of foreign sovereigns,
including those of sister tribal governments. Like all sovereigns, tribes must weigh
carefully the benefits and costs of any inter-governmental regime providing for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign orders. As "self-governing political com-
munities, 55 Indian tribes are politically independent from the States of the Union
and, with few exceptions, from one another. For tribes, the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign orders involves a diminution of tribal independence and a cession
of authority to foreign governments. Naturally, tribes are reluctant to cede any part
of their governmental authority, since they have for centuries witnessed the steady
erosion of their authority over their territories and their people. Yet, such a cession
of authority, if part of a reciprocal inter-governmental enforcement regime, has the
potential to expand the reach of tribal court judgments.
There are approximately 562 federally recognized Indian tribes in the continental
United States and Alaska. 6 Approximately 275 of these tribes have formal tribal
court systems. 57 As the Supreme Court has said, Indian tribal courts are "important
mechanisms for protecting significant tribal interests."5' Among those interests are
the preservation of unique "tribal customs and traditions"59 and the enforcement of
unique tribal laws and policies. Among tribal courts:
[tihere is widespread variety in the types of forums, and the law applied in each
is distinctly unique to each tribe. Some tribal courts resemble Western-style
judiciaries where written laws and rules of court procedure are applied .... [while]
[a]n increasing number of tribes are returning to their traditional means of
resolving disputes through the use of peacemaking, elders' councils and
sentencing circles.'
In addition, because not all tribes share common histories and values, there are
considerable variations in the laws and public policies among the various tribes.6'
55. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985).
56. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,180-84 (Dec. 5, 2003). There are 337
federally recognized Indian tribes within the continental United States and 225 within Alaska. Id.
57. Nat'l Tribal Justice Resource Ctr., Tribal Court History (2002), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/tribalcourts/history.asp (last visited July 10, 2004). For concise histories of Indian tribal courts and
descriptions of their role in the administration of justice in Indian country and in the United States, see Sandra Day
O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1 (1997); POMMERSHEIM, supra
note 42, at 57-135; VINE DELORIA, JR., & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 110-38
(1983).
58. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978); see also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S.
9, 14-15 (1987) ("Tribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-government, and the Federal Government has
consistently encouraged their development.").
59. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 331.
60. Nat'l Tribal Justice Resource Ctr., supra note 57.
61. The U.S. Supreme Court noted in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), that "wide variations in customs,
art, language, and physical characteristics separate the tribes, and their history has been marked by both intertribal
alliances and animosities." Id. at 695 (citing COHEN, supra note 1; HAROLD E. DRIVER, INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA
(1961); LESLIE SPIER, YUMAN TRIBES OF THE GILA RIVER (1933)).
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Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that most tribes have shown a
preference for comity over full faith and credit as the mechanism by which they will
recognize and enforce the court orders and judgments of other tribes. The "full faith
and credit obligation is exacting,"6 2 containing no "public policy exception,"63 but
instead ordering "submission-even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of
another [sovereign]... ."' By contrast, under comity, tribes recognize the judgments
of sister tribal courts not as a matter of right but as a matter of respect and
cooperation, and only when appropriate.65 Comity "flows generally from the respect
that one sovereign has for the sovereign acts of another,"'  but that respect, no
matter how deep, does not mandate the enforcement of foreign judgments that are
offensive to the public policy of the recognizing tribe.67 This flexibility allows tribes
to recognize and enforce certain sister tribal court judgments, while at the same time
reserving the right to withhold approval of any order the acceptance of which
"would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it
effect."68 Comity is, in a very real sense, more consistent than full faith and credit
with notions of tribal sovereignty and independence.
For tribes, the political ramifications of recognizing and enforcing foreign
judgments concerning the rights and responsibilities of their tribal members are
manifold. It has been said that issues of full faith and credit and comity in Indian
country "might appear at first glance to be a mundane issue having little to do with
the grand Indian law concept of tribal sovereignty. But there is nothing mundane
about the issue at all; there are important matters of tribal sovereignty involved in
the enforcement question."69
This is tribal sovereignty in the practical sense that is vitally important to the
people who actually live and go about their business on Indian reservations.
Enforcement of judgments touches the lives of Indian people directly and
immediately: a prevailing plaintiff in a tribal court case often must take hisjudgment off the reservation. A losing defendant in [an off-reservation] court
case finds her wages vanishing, or finds the judgment being enforced against
specific property [on the reservation] in ways that would be quite impossible
under traditional tribal ways. °
62. Baker v. Gen. Motors Co., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948)).
65. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (noting that "'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a
matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.").
66. Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, supra note 6, at 863.
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF UNITED STATES § 482 (providing that a
court of the United States need not recognize a foreign judgment if it is "repugnant to the public policy of the United
States or of the State where recognition is sought").
68. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 809 (quoting Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,
440 (3d Cir. 1971)).
69. Deloria & Laurence, supra note 6, at 368.
70. Id.
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The following is a brief-and by no means exhaustive-survey of the approaches
taken by various Indian tribes in the recognition and enforcement of foreign orders,
including those of sister tribes. The survey is drawn from tribal cases, codes, and
ordinances that have been published either in print
7 or on the Internet.12
A. Comity
Among tribes, comity is the preferred mechanism for enforcement of foreign
judgments, even those of sister tribal courts. The courts of the Navajo Nation have
articulated the prevailing tribal view:
[T]he issue presented when the decision of any state or Indian court is presented
to the courts of the Navajo Nation for enforcement is one of comity. Navajo
courts will honor and enforce foreign judgments upon consideration of the right
of the foreign court to issue the judgment, of the propriety of the proceeding, and
of any relevant public policy of the Navajo Nation.73
Like the Navajo Nation, most tribes, wishing to safeguard their independence, have
eschewed the application of full faith and credit, even as to the judgments of sister
tribal courts, and instead have elected to follow the "flexible enforcement-of-
judgment regime"74 of comity, recognizing only those foreign orders that do not
offend the recognizing tribe's public policy.
For example, the courts of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe have held that foreign
judgments should be "evaluated, and where appropriate, recognized through
the... flexible construct of 'comity."' Under Mashantucket Pequot law, tribal courts
"will not extend comity to foreign proceedings when doing so would be contrary to
the policies or prejudicial to the interest of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe. 76 The
courts must exercise their sound discretion to determine if enforcement of a
judgment would violate the tribe's public policy. The Mashantucket appellate court
stated:
71. See, e.g., Indian L. Rptr., vols. 1-31 (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program 1983-present); Navajo Rptr.,
vols 1-7 (Judicial Branch of Navajo Nation 1969-1999).
72. Searchable databases of reported tribal court decisions can be found on Westlaw at http://web2.westlaw.
com (reported decisions from Oklahoma tribes); Versuslaw, supra note 46 (reported decisions from sixteen tribes);
and the website of the National Tribal Justice Resource Center, supra note 57 (reported decisions from seventeen
tribes). Searchable databases of tribal constitutions, by-laws, codes, ordinances, and rules of court can be found on
the website of the National Tribal Justice Resource Center, supra note 57 (constitutions and/or by-laws of seventy-
nine tribes, and codes, ordinances, and/or rules of court of forty-four tribes). Non-searchable collections of tribal
laws can be found on the website of the National Indian Law Library of the Native American Rights Fund, available
at http://www.narf.org/nill/tribaldocs.html (constitutions and/or by-laws of fifty-three tribes and codes, ordinances,
and/or court rules of forty-four tribes) and on the website of the Native American Constitution and Law Digitization
Project of the University of Oklahoma Law Library and the National Indian Law Library, available at http://thorpe.
ou.edu/ (codes and/or ordinances of seven tribes). Links to the constitutions, codes, and/or court decisions of many
tribes can be found on the website of the Tribal Court Clearinghouse, available at http://www.tribal-institute.org,
and on the website of the National Indian Justice Center, available at http://nijc.indian.com.
73. In re Guardianship of Chewiwi, I Navajo Rptr. at 125-26.
74. Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, supra note 6, at 863.
75. Husband v. Wife, MPCA-2001-1065 (Mashantucket Pequot App. Ct., Jan. 24, 2003), available at
Versuslaw, supra note 46.
76. Smith v. Scott, MPTC-CV-2002-182 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal. Ct., Apr. 23, 2002), available at
Versuslaw, supra note 46.
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Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one
of practice, convenience, and expediency. Although more than mere courtesy
and accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an imperative or
obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression of understanding which demon-
strates due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights
of persons protected by its own laws. Comity should be withheld only when its
acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called
upon to give it effect ......
Similarly, under the laws of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, the tribal courts "apply the
doctrine of comity to the judicial proceedings of all foreign courts in which a final
judgment has been issued. '78 Comity is given to a foreign court judgment only if the
Oglala courts find:
that the foreign court actually had jurisdiction over both the parties and the
subject matter; (2) that the foreign courtjudgment was not obtained fraudulently;
(3) that the foreign court judgment was rendered by a system of law reasonably
assuring the requisites of an impartial administration of justice due to notice and
hearing were afforded; and (4) [that] the foreign court judgment did not
contravene the public policy of the jurisdiction in which it is relied upon.79
Numerous other tribes have selected comity as the mechanism by which they may
recognize and enforce foreign orders, including those of sister tribal courts.8"
Curiously, many of these tribes purport to give full faith and credit to foreign orders,
77. Husband v. Wife, supra note 75 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
78. Oglala Sioux Tribal Law & Order Code, ch. 2, § 24.4.1 (1996), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder/oglalalawandorder2.htm (last visited July 12, 2004).
79. Id. at ch. 2, § 24.4.5.
80. See, e.g., Fort Peck Comprehensive Code of Justice § 312 (2000), available at http://www.
tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/fortpeck.justicecode-8.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that the tribal
court "may as a matter of comity enforce the judgment of another Tribe, the United States, a state or foreign nation,"
provided that the tribal court "shall not enforce the judgment of another jurisdiction where evidence establishes
that... the judgment is contrary to the public policy of the Tribes"); Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua,
and Siuslaw Indians Tribal Code § 2-5-24 (2002), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
coos_umpquasiuslaw tribalcode_2_5.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that, "[i]n the interests of comity,
a party in whose favor a state court judgment or the judgment of another tribal court was entered may bring an
action for enforcement of the judgment in Tribal Court"); Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua, and
Siuslaw Indians Tribal Code §§ 2-4-1, 2-4-2 (2002), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
coosumpqua.siuslawjtribalcode_2_4.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that "[riecognition, implemen-
tation and enforcement of orders, judgments and/or decrees from courts other than the Tribal Court of the Con-
federated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians (Tribal Court) shall be allowed," provided that,
among other things, no "such order, judgment and/or decree is contrary to laws, both written and customary, of the
Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians"); Laws of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes, §§ 4-3-204, 4-3-205, available at http://doc.narf.org/nill/Codes/cskcode/cskciviljudgments.htm (last visited
Sept. 3, 2004) (providing that, "[i]n the interests of comity, a party in whose favor a state court judgment or the
judgment of another tribal court was entered may bring an action for enforcement of the judgment in Tribal Court";
tribal court may decline to enforce judgment based on "jurisdictional defects or infringement of the rights of the
defendant under the federal Indian Civil Rights Act" in issuing court); Little River Band of Ottawa Indians
Regulations, ch. R300, §§ 1.102, 1.103, 1.206 (2001), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
littleriver__ottawa.regulations.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that tribal, state, and federal court orders
may have "the same full recognition and enforcement" in tribal courts unless the "cause of action on which thejudgment is based is repugnant to the public policy or tribal custom of the Tribe"); see also infra notes 81-90 and
accompanying text.
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while at the same time permitting their courts to refuse to recognize or enforce
foreign judgments that are offensive to tribal public policy. These tribes use the
language of full faith, but the regime their laws describe is that of comity. For
example, the laws of the White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians provide that foreign
orders, including those of other tribal courts, "may be given full faith and credit in
the tribal court," provided that they do not "contravene the public policy of the
White Earth Band of Chippewa or interfere with the Band's right to make its own
laws and be governed by them."'" Another tribe, the Poarch Band of Creek Indians,
has adopted the Full Faith and Credit Clause as tribal law82 but still allows tribal
judges to exercise discretion in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments. The laws of the Poarch Band Creek Indians provide that the "Tribal Judge
shall... decide whether to extend full faith and credit to the judgment," and, in so
doing, the judge "shall have full and total discretion regarding this matter and shall
be guided by the best interests of the Tribes and the parties."" Other tribes following
similar approaches include the Confederated Tribes of the Grande Ronde Com-
munity of Oregon, 4 the Ely Shoshone Tribe, 5 the Bay Mills Indian Community,86
the Coquille Indian Tribe,87 and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians.
88
Some tribes require reciprocity before recognizing or enforcing foreign orders
under principles of comity. For example, the Coquille Indian Tribe will not enforce
an order or judgment of the courts of other tribes, states, or local governments if
81. White Earth Band of Chippewa Comprehensive Law and Order Manual, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
XXXIV (1998), available at http:/www.tribalresourcecenter.orgccfolder/whtearthlawandorder.htm (last visited
July 12, 2004).
82. Poarch Band of Creek Indians Code of Justice §§ 12-1-1, 12-1-2 (1989), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder/poarch-codeofjustice.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that tribe "recognizes
and adopts Article IV Section I of the Constitution of the United States" and will enforce as a tribal court judgment
any "civil judgment from another Tribal, State or Federal Court").
83. Id. § 12-1-3.
84. Confederated Tribes of Grande Ronde Community of Oregon, Tribal Court Ordinance § (d)(3) (1994),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.orgccfolder/grand-ronde-adoption.htm (last visited July 12, 2004)
(providing that tribal courts "shall give full faith and credit to the orders and judgments of the courts of other tribes,
states, and local governments," unless, among other things, "to do so would violate the public policy of the Tribe
or would be likely to harm the culture, traditions, or sovereignty of the Tribe").
85. Ely Shoshone Tribe Law and Order Code, tit. I, ch. I-I, § I-1-01 (2000), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder/ely.shoshonelawandorder-court.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) ("Tribal Court may
confer full faith and credit or comity to the judgments and orders of courts of other jurisdictions, as against Tribal
members on the Reservation, when the Tribal Court Judge determines that under the circumstances there was no
deprivation of fundamental due process and no injustice would result. The Tribe expects the courts of other
jurisdictions to confer full faith and credit or comity to the judgments and orders of the Tribal Court.").
86. Bay Mills Indian Community Laws and Codes, Tribal Court Rules, R. 104.1 (2000), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolderbaymillstoc.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that orders of
state, federal, and tribal courts shall be given full faith and credit in tribal court, provided that, among other things,
the orders are not "repugnant to the public policy" of the tribe).
87. Coquille Tribal Code, ch. 610, § 610.200.4, available at http://www.tribaresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
coquilletribalcourt.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that "Tribal Court shall give full faith and credit to
the orders and judgments of the courts of other tribes, states, and local governments," unless, among other things,
"[t]o do so would violate the public policy of the Tribe or would be likely to harm the culture, traditions or
sovereignty of the Tribe").
88. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Cherokee Code, ch. 25, § 25-5(a), (e) (2001), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.orglccfolder/eccodech25judgment.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that
"[flull faith and credit shall be given to judicial proceedings of all federal Courts, state Courts, and Courts of the
federally recognized Indian nations, Tribes, or bands, including Courts of Indian offenses," unless among other
things a foreign order "contravene[s] the public policy of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians").
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"[tihe court in question does not recognize the orders and judgments of the
[Coquille] Tribal Court."89 Other tribes have taken similar approaches. 90 Ordinarily,
reciprocity is not required for the enforcement of foreign judgments under modem
principles of comity.9.
B. Full Faith and Credit
Few tribes apply principles of full faith and credit to foreign orders, including
those of sister tribes, except when required to do so by federal law in select subject
areas. Of those tribes that do apply full faith and credit more broadly, most do so
only in respect to orders issued by jurisdictions that reciprocally accord full faith and
credit to tribal court orders. Very few tribes apply full faith and credit asymmetri-
cally, that is, without reciprocal respect for their tribal court orders.
Federal law requires tribes to accord full faith and credit to the orders of sister
tribal courts and, in some cases, state courts, in several subject matter areas,
including Indian child custody child support, and domestic violence. Most tribes
have complied with these federal requirements.
In the case of Indian child custody proceedings, the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) requires tribes to extend full faith and credit to the child custody orders of
other Indian tribes, but not to those of the state courts.92 Many tribes have adopted
laws implementing the Act as written, extending full faith and credit to tribal court
orders but declining to do so for state orders, 93 while others have elected to go
beyond the requirements of the Act and extend full faith and credit to state, as well
89. Coquille Indian Tribal Code, ch. 610, § 610.200, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder/coquillejtribalcourt.htm (last visited July 12, 2004).
90. See, e.g., Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Regulations, ch. R300, §§ 1.102, 1.103, 1.206 (2001),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolderlittleriverottawa-regulations.htm (last visited July 12,
2004) (providing that tribal, state, and federal court orders may be recognized and enforced by tribal court, provided
that the issuing court "provides reciprocal full recognition and enforcement to the judgments of this Indian Tribe");
Bay Mills Indian Community Laws and Codes, Tribal Court Rules, R. 104.1 (2000), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.orgccfolder/baymillstoc.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that orders of tribal, state, and
federal courts may be enforced by tribe if issuing jurisdiction provides for the reciprocal recognition and enforce-
ment of tribe's orders); Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Cherokee Code, ch. 25, § 25-5(a) (2001), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.orglccfolder/eccodech25judgment.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that
tribal court may recognize and enforce orders of tribal, state, and federal courts "that extend full faith and credit to
judgments and orders of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Court"); Ely Shoshone Tribe Law and Order Code, tit. I, ch.
I- 1, § 1- 1-01 (2000), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/ely shoshonelawandordercourt.
htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that "[t]he Tribe expects the courts of other jurisdictions to confer full
faith and credit or comity to the judgments and orders of the Tribal Court").
91. See, e.g., Wilson, 127 F.3d at 812; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED
STATES §§ 481-82 (2003).
92. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2000).
93. White Earth Band of Chippewa Comprehensive Law and Order Manual, Child/Family Protection Code,
ch. 11, § 5 (2000), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/whtearth-lawandorder.htm (last visited
July 12, 2004) (providing that state court child custody orders "may be recognized" by the tribal court only if the
state court properly exercised jurisdiction and provided due process to all parties and "the state court proceeding
does not violate the public policies, customs, or common law of the tribe," whereas the child custody orders of other
tribes "shall be recognized" if the tribal court properly exercised jurisdiction and afforded due process to all parties);
Poarch Band of Creek Indians Code § I OA-2-3(E), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/poarch
_codeofjustice.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (same); Statutes of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and
Chippewa Indians, tit. 10, ch. 1, § 106 (2002), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/travcode
10childfameld.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (same); Bay Mills Indian Community Laws and Codes, ch. VII, §
705(E) (2000), available at http://wwW.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/bmjuvenile.htm (last visited July 12,2004)
(same).
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as tribal, custody orders.94 ICWA does not mandate tribal recognition or enforce-
ment of non-custody orders concerning the welfare of Indian children, such as abuse
and neglect findings, and most tribes have refused to extend full faith and credit to
such cases.95
The Federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act requires tribes to
"enforce according to [their] terms [the] child support order[s] ' ' 96 of other tribes,
states, territories, and possessions. Most, if not all, tribes comply with this
requirement. 97 Similarly, most tribes comply fully with the requirement of the
94. See, e.g., Absentee Shawnee of Oklahoma Juvenile Code, ch. 1, § 108, available at http:/www.
tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/absentee-shawnee-tribalcode-juvenile.html (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing
that child custody orders of state courts and other tribal courts "shall be recognized and given full faith and credit,"
provided the issuing court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction, complied with the Indian Child Welfare Act,
and provided due process to all parties); Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Ordinances, ch. 900, § 3.11 (1998),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/littlefiver-ottawaordinances.htm (last visited July 12,
2004) (providing that child custody orders of state courts and other tribal courts "shall be recognized in accordance
with Model Rules for Full Faith and Credit and Enforcement of Foreign Court Judgments adopted by the Michigan
Indian Judicial Association"); Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon, Tribal Code §
7.17(e) (1996), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/grandjrondechildwelfare.htm (last visited
July 12, 2004) (providing that tribal courts "shall give full faith and credit to State and Tribal child custody orders,
where the state and tribe reciprocate in giving full faith and credit to Court Orders of the Grand Ronde Tribal Court,
and where such orders are consistent with the public policy of the tribe, the intent of the Indian Child Welfare Act,
and the laws and customs of the Tribe"). Some tribes extend full faith and credit to the child custody orders of states
if and only if the states comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act and extend full faith and credit to tribal child
custody court orders. See, e.g., Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Laws, vol. 1, tit. V, ch. 1, § 3 (2000), available at http://
www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/mpequotl.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that "[tihe Family
Court shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records and judicial decrees applicable to child custody
proceedings of any Court of competent jurisdiction to the same extent that such Court gives full faith and credit to
the public acts, records and judicial decrees of the Tribal Court"); see also id. at vol. 1, tit. VI, ch. 8, § 2(c)
(providing that tribal courts "shall abide by any applicable federal law concerning family and child support, custody
and enforcement matters, including, but not limited to, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, the Full Faith and Credit for Child
Support Orders Act"); Coquille Indian Tribal Code, ch. 644, § 644.050, available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder/coquille-intergovtalandchildwelfare.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that "tribal court
shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings applicable to the custody of an
Indian child of an Indian tribe, the United States, every state, every territory or possession of the United States and
foreign nations to the same extent that such entity gives full faith and credit to the public acts, records and judicial
proceedings of the Coquille Tribe").
95. See, e.g., Nez Perce Tribal Code, ch. 5-1, § 5-1-5, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder/nez perce-tribalcode5.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that "[sitate court orders and those issued
by other tribal courts involving children over whom the Court could take jurisdiction may be recognized by the
Court only after a full independent review of such state or tribal proceedings has determined.. .the proceedings do
not violate the public policies, or common law of the Nez Perce Tribe"); Skokomish Tribal Code, tit. 3, § 3.02.034
(2001), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/skokomishtribalcode-3.htm (last visited July
12, 2004) (providing that tribal Youth Court "may give recognition to orders issued by a state or another tribal court
as a matter of comity (courtesy) if the order does not violate the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Court granting
the order had jurisdiction over the case, due process was afforded to all parties, and the order does not violate the
public policy of the Skokomish Indian Tribe").
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2000).
97. See, e.g., Hanson v. Grandberry, No. CV 98-004 (Puyallup Tribal Ct. June 8, 1999), afftd, Grandberry
v. Grandberry, No. AP 98-004A (Puyallup App. Ct. Oct. 30, 1999) (granting full faith and credit to state court child
support order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738B); Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Medina, No. 97-005 (Tunica-Biloxi Tribal
Ct. Oct. 6, 1997) (same). Each of the above decisions is available at Versuslaw, supra note 46. See also Hopi
Parental Responsibility Ordinance § 13, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/hopi-lawand
order_parent.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that "[piroperly issued court and administrative orders,
judgments or decrees of other Indian tribes, states, or federal agencies, that relate to child support enforcement, will
be given full faith and credit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738B"); Absentee Shawnee of Oklahoma Juvenile Code, ch.
1, § 108, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/absentee-shawnee-tribalcode-juvenile.html (last
visited July 12, 2004) (providing that child support orders of state courts and other tribal courts "shall be recognized
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Violence Against Women Act to accord full faith and credit to valid protection
orders issued by other tribes and states.98
Some tribes apply full faith and credit even when they are not required to do so
by specific federal statutes (that is, statutes other than the Full Faith and Credit Act,
the applicability of which to tribes is questioned in part I, supra). Some do so only
in selected subject matter areas, such as marriage,99 divorce,"°° family relations,''
and secured transactions,102 to name a few,'0 3 while others accord full faith and credit
across the board to all valid orders of other tribal and state governments)°0
and given full faith and credit," provided the issuing court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction, complied
with the Indian Child Welfare Act, and provided due process to all parties).
98. See Nez Perce Tribal Code, ch. 2-2, R. 63(e) (1999), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder/nez-perce-tribalcode2.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that "[any domestic protection order
issued.. .by one State or Indian tribe.. .shall be accorded full faith and credit by the Nez Perce Tribe and enforced
as if it were the order of the Nez Perce Tribe"); Nez Perce Tribal Code, ch. 7-3, § 7-3-6, available at http://www.
tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/nez-percejtribalcode7.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (same); Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians, Cherokee Code, ch. 25, § 25-5(g) (2001), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.
org/ccfolder/eccodech25judgment.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing that "the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Court shall give full faith and credit to all Protection Orders" issued in compliance with the Violence Against
Women Act); Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Cherokee Code, ch. 50B, § 50B-4(d) (2001), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.orglccfolder/eccodech5Obdomviolence.htm (last visited July 12, 2004) (providing
that "[v]alid protective orders that are entered by the courts of another state or Indian Tribe and are consistent with
18 U.S.C. 2265 shall be accorded full faith and credit by the Cherokee Court"); Confederated Tribes of Siletz
Indians of Oregon, Tribal Government Operations, Domestic and Family Violence Code, pt. 3, § 12.535 (1999),
available at http://doc.narf.org/nill/Codes/siletzcode/silcode2ldomandfamviol.htm (last visited July 12, 2004)
(providing that "Tribal Court will afford full faith and credit to the order for protection if the order is consistent with
18 U.S.C. § 2265(b)"). But see Hopi Family Relations Ordinance, § 21.01, available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder/hopi-lawandorder family.htm (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing that, "[u]pon determining
that a foreign court had jurisdiction to enter a protection order, a Hopi Tribal court may issue an order recognizing
that protection order and according it comity") (emphasis added).
99. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Cherokee Code, ch. 50, § 50-2 (2000), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder/eccodech50family.htm (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing that a "marriage duly
solemnized under the laws of North Carolina or any other state or Indian nation shall be given full faith and credit
within the Eastern Band's territory").
100. Poarch Band of Creek Indians Code of Justice § 15-1-3, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder/poarch-codeofjustice.htm (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing that "[p]rior divorce decrees entered by
the courts of competent jurisdiction between members of the tribe are hereby given full faith and credit").
101. See, e.g., Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Laws, vol. 1, tit. VI, ch. 8, § 2(b) (2000), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/mpequotl.htm (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing that foreign
judgments in family relations matters shall be recognized and enforced by tribal courts "provided that such
judgment does not contravene the public policy of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe").
102. Bay Mills Indian Community Laws and Codes, Secured Transactions Ordinance, § 8 (2000), available
at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/bmsecured.htm (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing that tribal
court shall give "full faith and credit to any final order or judgment of any other court of competent jurisdiction"
in any action by a secured party).
103. At least one tribe selectively accords full faith and credit to money judgments issued by state courts. See
Lower Sioux Community in Minnesota Judicial Code, ch. 2, § 5 (1997), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder/lower_sioux-judicialcodel.htm (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing that "[t]he Tribal Court
shall enforce and grant full faith and credit to a final judgment for money damages properly issued by a court of any
state or the United States"). Another tribe accords full faith and credit to the decisions of its former C.F.R. (Code
of Federal Regulations) court. See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Cherokee Code, ch. 1, § 1-41(g) (2001),
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/eccodech I civil.htm (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing
that "the Cherokee Court shall give full faith and credit to all judgments and orders entered by the CFR Court that
were properly within the jurisdiction of the CFR Court" before transfer of authority from the CFR Court of Indian
Offenses to the Cherokee Court pursuant to the Indian Self Determination Act contract between the United States
and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians).
104. See infra notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
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Only a few tribes grant full faith and credit to other tribal or state court orders
without conditioning that grant on the reciprocal provision of full faith and credit by
the issuing tribes and states.' 05 Among the tribes with asymmetrical schemes is the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, which, in Eberhard v. Eberhard,"6 bound itself to the
full faith and credit mandate of the PKPA without assurance that other tribes and
states would reciprocate.""' To be clear, though, the aspiration of a reciprocal
enforcement regime motivated the Eberhard court. The inclusion of Indian tribes
within the mandate of federal full faith and credit statutes, the tribal court said,
serves to integrate tribes and their courts "into the cooperative federalism framework
of the national union.' 0 8 This strengthens, rather than diminishes, tribal sovereignty,
for the reciprocal application of full faith and credit by states "to tribal courts and
their orders recognizes and enforces the sovereignty of Indian tribes."" 9
These aspirations have been realized in Oklahoma, where the state supreme court
has promulgated a rule that "[t]he district courts of the State of Oklahoma shall grant
full faith and credit and cause to be enforced any tribal judgment where the tribal
court that issued the judgment grants reciprocity to judgments of the courts of the
State of Oklahoma.... "" Several tribes in Oklahoma have followed suit, adopting
rules extending full faith and credit to reciprocating state, federal, and tribal courts."'
105. See Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, Tribal Court Rules, R. 4.27.1,
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/red_clifftribalcode4.htm (last visited July 13, 2004)
(providing that tribal court "shall grant full faith and credit to the judicial records, orders and judgments of the courts
of the State of Wisconsin and to the acts of other governmental entities of the State of Wisconsin"); Confederated
Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians, Tribal Code, tit. 2, § 2-5-25 (2003), available at http://doc.
narf.org/nill/Codes/cooscode/coost2rules.htm (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing that tribal court may decline
to enforce state court judgment or judgment of another tribal court only "[i]f the court finds jurisdictional or
constitutional defects in the judgment or the record of the state or tribal court proceedings"); Lower Sioux
Community in Minnesota, Judicial Code, ch. 2, § 5 (2000), available at http:ldoc.narf.orglnilllCodes/lscode/
Iscodetl.htm#courts (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing that "Tribal Court shall enforce and grant full faith and
credit to a final judgment for money damages properly issued by a court of any state or the United States," provided
that no "substantial question appears with respect to the jurisdiction of the foreign court and the regularity of the
foreign proceedings").
106. 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Ct. App. 1997); see supra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
107. Indeed, in a separate concurring opinion in Eberhard, Chief Justice Pommersheim warned that, despite
the tribal court's finding that Congress intended to include tribes within the full faith and credit provisions of the
PKPA, "it seems to be highly likely that other courts-federal, state, and tribal-may reach the opposite and not
unreasonable conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to support such a finding of congressional intent." 24
Indian L. Rptr. at 6068. Pommershiem concluded that "it behooves the Congress itself to clarify its meaning" in the
PKPA to avoid confusion and a lack of uniformity in the application of the Act. Id.
108. 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6064.
109. Id.
110. Okla. D. Ct. R. 30(A) (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2 app. (1995 Supp.)) (authorized by OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 728 (1992 Supp.)).
11l. Cherokee Nation Judicial Appeals Tribunal, In the Matter of the Adoption of Standards for Recognition
of Judicial Proceedings of Other Sovereigns in the Courts of the Cherokee Nation: Full Faith and Credit, 6 Okla.
Trib. 232, 1995 WL 17007140 (May 26, 1995); Supreme Court of the Kickapoo Tribe, In the Matter of the Adop-
tion of Standards for Recognition of Judicial Proceedings of Other Sovereigns in the Courts of the Kickapoo Tribe
of Oklahoma: Full Faith and Credit, 6 Okla. Trib. 223, 1994 WL 16006119 (Dec. 5, 1994); Supreme Court of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, Order Adopting Standards for Recognition of Judicial Proceedings of Other Sovereigns
in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Courts: Full Faith and Credit, 3 Okla. Trib. 211, 1993 WL 831883 (Aug. 4, 1993);
see also Dennis W. Arrow, Oklahoma's Tribal Courts: A Prologue, the First Fifteen Years of the Modem Era, and
a Glimpse at the RoadAhead, 19 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 5, 68-69 (1994) ("[Als of February 1994, seven Oklahoma
tribes [the Absentee-Shawnee, Cheyenne-Arapaho, Citizen Band Potawatomi. Iowa, Kaw, Kickapoo, and Sac and
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For example, the Cherokee Nation Judicial Appeals Tribunal has adopted the
following rule:
Provided that a foreign judgment was not rendered through fraud and the issuing
court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction, all courts of the Cherokee
Nation shall grant full faith and credit and cause to be enforced therein any
foreign judgment, if the Federal, State or Tribal Court that issued such judgment
grants reciprocity to judgments of the Cherokee Courts." 2
The Cherokee Nation and other tribes in Oklahoma voluntarily opted to participate
in this fully reciprocal enforcement of judgment regime, and by doing so have
extended the reach of their tribal court judgments. Other tribes outside Oklahoma
have enacted similar laws." 3
Thus, while most tribes have opted for the flexible regime of comity, some have
elected the more exacting standard of full faith and credit, although most tribes in
the latter category have conditioned their grant of full faith and credit on the
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of tribal court orders by foreign jurisdic-
tions.
I. FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON TRIBAL ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN ORDERS
Unlike most sovereigns, Indian tribes lack jurisdiction over all people and
property within their territories." 4 Without full territorial sovereignty, tribes often
are unable to enforce foreign orders, even when they wish to do so, since tribal
enforcement authority is predicated on adjudicative jurisdiction over person or
property against which enforcement is sought. Of particular concern is the erosion
Fox] 'ha[d] enacted statutes or rules recognizing foreign judgments of certain courts'... [a]nd the Court of Indian
Offenses for the Anadarko Area tribes, which serves the Apache, Caddo, Comanche, Delaware, Fort Sill Apache,
Kiowa, Pawnee, Ponca, Tonkawa, and Wichita tribes 'has customarily recognized state judgments and is expected
to formalize this practice.....") (quoting Report of the Oklahoma Supreme Court Committee to Recommend
Standard for Recognition of Judicial Proceedings in Tribal Courts (1994), reprinted in 7 Sovereignty Symposium,
4 (Oklahoma Supreme Court et al. eds., 1994) (internal citations omitted).
112. 6 Okla. Trib. 232, 1995 WL 17007140.
113. See, e~g., Mille Lacs Band Stat. Ann. § 2009 (2003), available at http://doc.narf.orglnill/Codes/mlcode/
mltitle24.htm (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing that "[flull faith and credit shall be given to.. civil judicial
proceeding of all other reservations and all Federal and State jurisdictions that have enacted a full faith and credit
provision in their Constitution or Statutes or on a case-by-case basis, have granted full faith and credit to judicial
determinations of the Court of Central Jurisdiction" of the Mills Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians); Ho-Chunk Nation
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 73 (2002), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/hochunkcivil
proc.htm (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing that tribal courts shall "extend full faith and credit to the judicial
records, orders and judgments of the Courts of the State of Wisconsin, the Courts of other states, federal Courts,
and other tribal Courts to the same extent the other jurisdiction extends full faith and credit to the judicial records,
orders and judgments of this Court"); Stockbridge-Munsee Tribal Law, ch. 1, § 1.37 (2003), available at http://doc.
narf.org/nill/Codes/stockmcodelsm I court.htm (last visited July 13, 2004) (providing that orders of other tribal, state,
and federal courts shall be entitled to full faith and credit in Stockbridge-Munsee Courts, as long as issuing court
"grants full faith and credit to the judicial records, orders and judgments of the courts of the Stockbridge-Munsee
Court").
114. In Duro v. Reina, the Court noted that tribes "no longer" possess "full territorial sovereignty," which
includes "the power to enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign's territory, whether citizens or
aliens." 495 U.S. at 685. Rather, the Court said, "the retained sovereignty of the tribes is that needed to control their
own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and social order." Id. at 685-86 (citing Wheeler,
435 U.S. at 326).
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under federal law of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, including non-Indians and
Indians who are members of other tribes, for it may preclude tribal enforcement of
foreign orders against these nonmembers.
In United States v. Mazurie, the Supreme Court stated that "surely... Indian tribes
within 'Indian country' are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary organiza-
tions."",.15 The Court described tribes as "unique aggregations possessing attributes
of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,"'1 16 noting that Indians
"are 'a separate people' possessing 'the power of regulating their internal and social
relations."" 7 However, in the nearly three decades since the Court decided Mazurie,
it systematically has eroded the governing authority of Indian tribes. Time and
again, the Court has held that tribes do not possess full territorial jurisdiction to
prosecute, regulate, tax, and adjudicate all activities that occur within their reserva-
tions. 18
A. Criminal Jurisdiction
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,' 9 the Court held that Indian tribes do not
possess the inherent authority to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes in
Indian country. The Court "rested its conclusion.. in large part upon 'the commonly
shared presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the lower federal
courts,"' that tribes lack such power. 20 The Court ultimately held that tribes had
been implicitly divested of this power because its exercise was "inconsistent with
their status" as domestic dependent nations.' 2' That status and its contours were
imposed on tribes by the political branches of the federal government, through
treaties and statutes: "[T]he Court held in [Oliphant] that the power to prosecute
115. 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886)).
118. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that, by virtue of their status as
domestic dependent nations, Indians tribes do not possess criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (invalidating tribal regulation of non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian
lands within Indian country, holding that, as a general rule, tribes lack civil jurisdiction over non-Indian conduct
on such lands); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)
(holding that tribe lacked jurisdiction to zone land held by non-Indians in fee simple within area of reservation
opened to non-Indian settlement); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that Indian tribes do not possess
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (holding that tribe
lacked jurisdiction to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on reservation land Congress had taken to build a
dam, reservoir, and recreation area); Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that tribal court did
not have jurisdiction over civil cause of action between non-Indian litigants despite fact that cause of action accrued
on reservation); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (holding that tribe did not have jurisdiction
to impose occupancy tax on non-Indian residents of hotel on reservation); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)
(holding that tribal court did not have jurisdiction over civil cause of action brought by tribal member against state
police officer for unlawful search and seizure, despite fact that search occurred on tribal trust land). For thoughtful
discussions of these cases, see Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and Its Discontents, 13 KANS. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59
(2003); Frickey, supra note 3; Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society's Judicial Reluctance to Allow Tribal Civil
Law to Apply to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography and the Indian Civil Rights Act,
30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781 (1996); and Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
119. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
120. United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628, 1636 (2004) (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206).
121. 435 U.S. at 208 (citing Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)).
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nonmembers was an aspect of the tribes' external relations and hence part of the
tribal sovereignty that was divested by treaties and by Congress. 122
In Duro v. Reina,123 the Court extended this holding to nonmember Indians, ruling
that, under then prevailing federal Indian policy, "the retained sovereignty of the
tribe as a political and social organization to govern its own affairs does not include
the authority to impose criminal sanctions against a citizen outside its own member-
ship." 1 24 As it had in Oliphant, the Court based its decision, in part, on the prevailing
views of the political branches of government that tribes lacked criminal authority
over nonmember Indians.
25
One year after Duro was decided, Congress altered the political landscape,
restoring the inherent criminal authority of Indian tribes over nonmember Indians
through an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act. 126 This amendment,
commonly referred to as the "Duro fix," "recognized and affirmed" that the inherent
powers of tribal self-government include the power "to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over all Indians," member and nonmember alike.
27
In United States v. Lara, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Duro fix,
holding that "the Constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise
of their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians."'28 The Court
characterized Oliphant and Duro as "federal common law" decisions. 9 They were
not mandated by the Constitution, 30 but rather "reflect[ed] the Court's view of the
tribes' retained sovereign status as of the time the Court made them."'' Noting that
the federal common law is "subject to the paramount authority of Congress,"'32 the
Court held that Congress may, through positive legislative enactments, take actions
to "modify or adjust the tribes' status."'133 Through the Duro fix, Congress "lift[ed]
the restrictions on the tribes' criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians' 34 and,
in so doing, "chang[ed] the relevant legal circumstances" upon which Duro rested.'35
As a result, the Court distinguished Duro136 and held that Indian tribes once again
122. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1636 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206). The Court reiterated this holding in Wheeler,
435 U.S. at 326, and Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686 (1990).
123. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686.
124. Id. at 679.
125. Id. at 689-92.
126. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, § 8077(b)-(c), 104 Stat. 1892-1893 (temporary legislation in effect until Sept. 30,
1991) and Act of Oct. 28, 1991, 105 Stat. 646 (permanent legislation) (codified by 25 U.S.C. 1301(2)).
127. 25 U.S.C. 1301(2).
128. 124 S. Ct. at 1639.
129. Id. at 1645 (quoting County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 233-36 (1985)).
130. Id. at 1636 (noting that "the Constitution does not dictate the metes and bounds of tribal autonomy").
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1637 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (198 1)). In Milwaukee, the Court held that
where "Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rest[ing] on federal common law the need
for... lawmaking by federal courts disappears." 451 U.S. at 314.
133. 124 S. Ct. at 1636.
134. Id. at 1633.
135. id. at 1636.
136. Id. at 1637 ("Duro... [is] not determinative because Congress has enacted a new statute, relaxing
restrictions on the bounds of the inherent tribal authority that the United States recognizes. And that fact makes all
the difference.").
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possess the inherent authority to prosecute nonmember Indians for crimes
committed in Indian Country.'37
The Lara Court mentioned, but did not "consider," the question of "whether the
Constitution's Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses prohibit tribes from pro-
secuting a nonmember citizen of the United States."'138 Thus, while the Court held
that Congress possesses "the constitutional power to enact a statute that modifies
tribal power,"' 139 it did not decide whether the Duro fix itself ran afoul of the
Constitution by permitting tribes to prosecute nonmember Indian citizens without
affording them "certain constitutional safeguards."'" The Court noted its "reserva-
tions" about the validity of tribal prosecutions of nonmembers, but it found that non-
members could raise constitutional challenges to future tribal court criminal pro-
ceedings, "should they wish to do so," by filing habeas writs in federal district court
under the Indian Civil Rights Act. 4 ' Thus, just as it had in Oliphant and Duro, the
Court in Lara suggested that there may be "constitutional limitations" on the ability
of Indian tribes to prosecute non-tribal members but stopped short of finding any
such violations.
42
In respect to the Due Process Clause, the Court has stated that it would be
"inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government" 143 to permit
Indian tribes to prosecute non-tribal members in "tribal courts which do not accord
the full protections of the Bill of Rights."'4 The Court has long held that the Bill of
Rights does not apply to Indian tribal governments, 45 and while the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA) imposes on tribal governments "some.. .guarantees of fair
procedure,"' 146 it does not incorporate all of the protections under the Bill of Rights.
For example, the ICRA contains no guarantee of court appointed counsel for
indigent criminal defendants. In light of this and other limitations, the Court has
suggested that there may be "constitutional limitations" on the ability of Congress,
"through recognition of inherent tribal authority" or otherwise, to "subject American
citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that does not provide constitutional
protections as a matter of right."'
147
Further, the Court has "hesitate[d] to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty" that
would permit nonmembers to be tried by "political bodies that do not include
them."4 8 Nonmembers are "not constituents of the governing Tribe." 149 They do not
137. Id. at 1639. This holding is consistent with the Court's statement in Wheeler that, if a tribe were deprived
of an aspect of its inherent power "by statute or treaty," Congress could restore the tribe's inherent powers without
delegating federal power or transforming the tribe into "an arm of the Federal Government." 435 U.S. at 328 n.28.
138. 124 S. Ct. at 1636.
139. Id. at 1638-39.
140. Id. at 1638.
141. Id. at 1638-39.
142. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 693-94.
143. Colville, 447 U.S. at 153.
144. Id. at 153-54 (summarizing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208-10: Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
145. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (896)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 693-94 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957)).
148. Id. at 693.
149. Colville, 447 U.S. at 161.
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"have a say in tribal affairs or significantly share in tribal disbursements."'' 50 They
cannot "vote, hold office, or serve on a jury under [tribal] authority."'' They are
excluded from the tribal political process and, according to the Court, have not
consented in any meaningful sense to the exercise of tribal authority over them. To
subject such individuals to tribal authority may offend basic notions of due process
and participatory democracy. Noting that the Bill of Rights is not applicable to tribal
governments, the Court stated in Duro, "This is all the more reason to reject an
extension of tribal authority over those who have not given the consent of the
governed that provides a fundamental basis for power within our constitutional
system."' 15 2 Highlighting the distinction between tribal members and nonmembers,
the Court has said that tribal jurisdiction over members is "justified by the voluntary
character of tribal membership and the concomitant right of participation in a tribal
government, the authority of which rests on consent."' 5
3
As for the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has suggested that congressional
authorization of tribal power over nonmember Indians, but not over non-Indians,
may raise equal protection concern's. Those concerns could be addressed, it seems,
by extending tribal power over non-Indians, too.
Thus, while several Justices have made clear their "very substantial concerns over
the government's proposition that within the territorial United States a non-
constitutional entity can be allowed to try a United States citizen,"' 55 the Court has
deferred consideration of those concerns until a later date. 56
B. Civil Jurisdiction
In Montana v. United States,5 7 the Court extended to the civil context the
principle that tribes have implicitly lost those elements of their inherent authority
that are inconsistent with their dependent status.
[T]hrough their original incorporation into the United States as well as through
specific treaties and statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many of the attributes
of sovereignty .... "The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty
has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an
Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe .... These limitations rest on the fact
that the dependent status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is
150. Id.
151. Duro, 495 U.S. at 688.
152. id. at 694 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 172-73 (1982)).
153. Id.
154. See Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1638.
155. Oral Argument Transcript at 21, United States v. Lara, Supreme Court No. 03-107 (argued Jan. 21,
2004); see also Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1651 (Souter and Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
156. Although the Court ordinarily accords considerable "deference" to Congress when it legislates in respect
to Indian affairs, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 459 (1995), that deference is not
unlimited. The Court reviews Congress's actions to determine whether they are "'tied rationally to the fulfillment
of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians."' Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73,
83-85 (1977) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974)), and its "solemn commitment" to uphold
Indian rights. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. The Court may also review Congress's actions to determine whether they
run afoul of the Constitution. For example, in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), the Court held
that Congress's taking of the Black Hills in South Dakota from the Sioux Nation violated the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 423-24.
157. 450U.S.544(1981).
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necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their
external relations. But the powers of self-government, including the power to
prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They
involve only the relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not such
powers as would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status."' 55
The Montana Court held that as a "general proposition... the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
tribe."' 5 9 There are two exceptions to this general proposition:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.160
However, in the two-plus decades since the Court articulated these principles, it
has only once invoked either exception to uphold the tribal exercise of civil
regulatory or adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers.' 6 By contrast, the Court
repeatedly has voided tribal actions concerning nonmembers, including regulation
of on-reservation hunting and fishing by non-Indians,162 zoning of on-reservation
lands owned in fee by non-Indian lands, 163 on-reservation conduct of state police
officers, 64 imposition of hotel occupancy taxes on on-reservation lands, 165 non-
Indian hotel patrons, and the adjudication in tribal court of disputes arising in Indian
Country, but involving nonmembers.'6 As one scholar had noted, the Court "refuses
to say what types of activities by nonmembers... would meet the Montana excep-
tions. ' 167
The Court's rationale for finding a divestiture of tribal authority over nonmem-
bers in the civil context mirrors its rationale in the criminal context. The Court is
reluctant to subject citizens to the jurisdiction of tribal governments and courts since
they are not subject to the constraints imposed by the Bill of Rights. Admittedly, this
concern is less pronounced in the civil context than in the criminal context, since
"[t]he exercise of criminal jurisdiction subjects a person not only to the adjudicatory
power of the tribunal, but also to the prosecuting power of the tribe, and involves a
158. Id. at 563-64 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
159. Id. at 565.
160. Id. at 565-66.
161. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, the Court held that tribal
regulation of non-Indian fee-patented lands in a predominantly Indian-owned "closed area" of reservation was
justified, in part, by the "threat to the Closed Area's cultural and spiritual values" posed by proposed non-Indian
development projects. 492 U.S. 408, 443 (1989) (Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., in whose judgment Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurred) (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
162. See Montana, 450 U.S. 544; Bourland, 508 U.S. 679.
163. See Brendale, 492 U.S. 408.
164. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
165. See Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. 645.
166. See Strate, 520 U.S. 438; Hicks, 533 U.S. 353.
167. Royster, Oliphant and Its Discontents, supra note 118, at 64.
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far more direct intrusion on personal liberties."' 68 The Court is also reluctant to
allow tribes to regulate the conduct of nonmembers who have no right to participate
in tribal government. In addition, in the civil context, the Court has a third concern,
namely that the federal courts have only limited authority, under current law, to
review the final judgments of Indian tribal courts. The federal courts may hear
challenges to the subject matter jurisdiction of tribal courts,'69 but they may not
review the ultimate dispositions of tribal courts on the merits of the cases before
them. 7° Commenting on these concerns, one scholar has noted, "the Court has found
it increasingly incongruous that tribes, as entities within the borders of the United
States subject to ultimate congressional control, may use the coercive power of
government against nonmembers without being subject to all of the basic constitu-
tional limitations and remedies."''
The Court's dictate in the civil context is clear: the "exercise of tribal power
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot
survive without express congressional delegation."' 7 2 Thus, under the present
concepts of federal Indian law, tribes find themselves increasingly unable to
regulate, tax, or adjudicate disputes concerning the activities of non-tribal members
in Indian Country. 173
This raises serious problems for tribes that seek to enforce the orders of other
tribes on non-tribal members. Consider the following hypothetical:
Suppose Jane Baker, a member of Tribe B, is traveling in her car on the
reservation of Tribe A when she is struck by another car, driven by John Adams,
a member of Tribe A. Baker suffers permanent paralysis as a result of the
collision. She sues Adams in the courts of Tribe A, seeking money damages for
injuries she sustained as a result of Adams' negligence.74 The courts of Tribe
A exercise jurisdiction over the case since Baker, the non-tribal member, has
consented to the jurisdiction of the court; Adams is a tribal member; and the
cause of action accrued on the reservation of Tribe A. The tribal court rules in
168. Duro, 495 U.S. at 688.
169. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985) (holding that subject
matter jurisdiction of Indian tribal courts is a federal question that federal courts may review); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.
v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 10 (1987) (same).
170. In the criminal context, the federal courts possess habeas review, in cases of unlawful detention, under
ICRA. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000). See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 (1978).
171. Frickey, supra note 3, at 65.
172. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
173. Curiously, under current precedents and in view of the Duro fix, tribes may possess greater criminal
powers over nonmember Indians than they do civil powers.
174. Baker may also be able to sue Adams in state court. This would certainly be the case if the state in which
Reservation A is located were a Public Law 280 state, since Public Law 280 grants to states and their courts the
power to exercise jurisdiction over "civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which
arise in.. Indian country.. to the same extent [the] State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action." 25 U.S.C.
§ 1322(a) (2000); see Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), amended by Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. IV (82 Stat.
78) (codified by 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326). Even if Public Law 280 were not applicable, the state courts nonetheless
may have jurisdiction over Baker's suit, provided that the exercise of state jurisdiction is not preempted by federal
law, see, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333, 334 (1983), and does not unlawfully
"infringe[] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 220 (1959). Resolution of these questions requires a careful balancing of the relevant tribal, federal, and
state interests.
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favor of Baker, awarding her a judgment of $1,000,000 against Adams. Adams
moves to the reservation of Tribe B, in part to evade enforcement of the judg-
ment of tribal court A. Baker seeks enforcement of the judgment in the courts of
Tribe B. Absent Adams' consent, the courts of Tribe B likely will not have
jurisdiction to enforce the order. Although Baker is a member of Tribe B, Adams
is not. The cause of action did not arise out of a consensual relationship between
Adams and Baker, or between Adams and Tribe B, and it is unlikely that the
underlying car accident, which took place on the reservation of Tribe A,
threatened the political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of
Tribe B. (See Table 1.)
Without the possibility of intertribal enforcement of tribal court judgments, the
effect of certain tribal judgments will, as this example illustrates, be severely
limited. It is axiomatic that "[n]o legal judgment has any effect, of its own force,
beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived.' ' 175 If the
state in which Tribe B is located does not recognize tribal court tort judgments,
either under principles of full faith and credit or comity, 76 Ms. Baker will be unable
to enforce the judgment she obtained against Mr. Adams, at least insofar as Adams
does not return to the reservation of Tribe A, thereby subjecting himself once again
to the jurisdiction of the courts of Tribe A.
C. Congressional Restoration of Jurisdiction
In Lara, the Court held that Congress may, in its exercise of "plenary power"
over Indian affairs, "relax restrictions" imposed by the political branches of
government on the inherent powers of tribes. 177 Thus, theoretically, Congress has the
power to restore to tribes the full powers of sovereignty they once had over all
persons and activities within their territories. If it were to do so, and if its actions
were to be upheld by the courts, Congress could eliminate the jurisdictional deficits
that thwart full intertribal enforcement of tribal court judgments.
However, the prospect of a meaningful restoration by Congress of the territorial
jurisdiction of tribes is limited by at least two factors: politics and, potentially, the
Constitution. First, Congress appears unwilling, as a political matter, to subject non-
Indians, and in the civil context, nonmember Indians, to the full authority of Indian
tribal governments. In the quarter century-plus since the Court began unraveling
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians and nonmembers in Oliphant, Congress has only
once enacted restorative legislation. That legislation, the Duro fix, restored only one
aspect of the inherent tribal sovereignty the Court found divested by federal law:
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Congress has not restored the
175. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 807.
176. Several states have no laws or policies addressing the recognition or enforcement of tribal court
judgments, apart from the requirements imposed upon them by federal law in select subject matter areas, including
child custody, child support, and domestic violence. These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri,
Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. See Leeds, supra note 6,
at 336-38.
177. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1631-34. Undercurrent precedents, the contours of tribal self-government are subject
to Congress's plenary "control and definition." Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'rs, 476 U.S. 877, 891 (1986).
This power includes the "authority to... modify...the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise
possess." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56.
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criminal jurisdiction of tribes over non-Indians and it has not restored the full range
of civil jurisdiction tribes once possessed over nonmembers.
Table 1
Tribal Court A Tribal Court B
A Moves to Reservation B
Member of Tribe B Sues Member of B Seeks Civil Enforcement of
Claim Tribe A for Money Damages Arising Judgment of Tribal Court A against
out of Car Accident on Reservation A Nonmember A
A Challenges Jurisdiction of Tribal
Court B
Plaintiff, B, Is Member of Tribe B
Plaintiff, B, Is Nonmember of Tribe A,
but Consents to Jurisdiction of Tribal
Court A Defendant, A, Is Nonmember of Tribe
B, and Does Not Consent to Jurisdiction
of Tribal Court B
Basis for
Tribal Court
Jurisdiction There Is No Consensual Relationship
Defendant, A, Is Member of Tribe A between Nonmember A and Member
B
Car Accident on Reservation A Does
Cause of Action Accrued on Not Threaten Political Integrity,
Reservation A Economic Security, or Health and
Welfare of Tribe B
Tribal Court A Grants Judgment for Tribal Court B Lacks Jurisdiction To
Judgment Money Damages in Favor of Enforce Judgment of Tribal Court A
Nonmember B against Member A against Nonmember A
Second, as discussed above, the Court has noted that the Constitution may impose
limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction by Indian tribes over nonmembers. Tribes
are not subject to the Bill of Rights, they do not allow political participation by
nonmembers, and the final rulings of their courts cannot be appealed to federal
court. Thus, even if Congress were to restore inherent tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers, as it did in the Duro fix, its actions may not survive scrutiny in a
subsequent constitutional challenge. Thus, without altering fundamentally the nature
of Indian tribal governments, and eliminating the traditional independence of tribes
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from the mandates of the Constitution, Congress may not be able to authorize the
exercise of tribal power over nonmembers, including Indians from other tribes. 1
7 8
Many Indian tribes are reluctant, and justifiably so, to advocate for the continued
exercise of plenary power by Congress. The plenary power doctrine is unmoored
from the Constitution"' and offensive to basic principles of tribal sovereignty and
self-government.8 0 In the area of cross-boundary enforcement of court orders,
Congress has often legislated in a manner that requires tribes to enforce the orders
of states and other tribes, without regard to public policy concerns that militate
against enforcement. Few would argue that tribal solutions are superior to those
mandated by Congress.
Tribes are wise to seek alternatives to insulate themselves from future Court
decisions finding the ordinary exercise of tribal authority over nonmembers to be
unconstitutional, on the one hand, and the negative repercussions of the plenary
power doctrine, on the other.
IV. INTERTRIBAL GOVERNING BODIES
This part of the article and the next discuss the potential for tribes to create
intertribal governing bodies to broaden the jurisdictional reach of each of their tribal
governments and to enact intertribal compacts providing for the reciprocal
enforcement of tribal court orders based on principles of comity.
178. These constitutional concerns apply with equal force to congressional actions to restore inherent tribal
jurisdiction and congressional delegations of federal power to Indian tribes. In Lara, the Court noted that, if these
concerns were valid, "any prosecution of a nonmember Indian" in tribal court would be invalid, regardless of the
source of the tribal court's power. 124 S. Ct. at 1638. It has been suggested that a delegation of federal power to
Indian tribes would create additional "grave constitutional difficulties." Id. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment). In an amicus brief filed in Lara, see Brief of Amicus Curiae National Congress of American Indians at
26-29, United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004) (No. 03-107), the National Congress of American Indians
noted three such difficulties: First, because tribal courts are non-article Ill courts, any delegation of federal power
to them would have to satisfy "Article Il's guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication."
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986). Second, if tribal courts were to exercise
federal power delegated by Congress, presumably they would be article I, or legislative, courts. As such, tribal
judges would be "inferior Officers" whose appointments would have to "conform to the Appointments Clause of
the Constitution." Brief of Amicus Curiae National Congress of American Indians at 27, Lara, (No. 03-107); U.S.
CONST. art. ll, § 2, cl. 2; see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that "any appointee
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States' and
must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of [article II]"). The Appointments Clause
provides that "Congress may by law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Finally, "if
Congress converted tribal courts to federal agencies or instrumentalities, the United States would face expanded
liability for the torts of tribal courts and prosecutors pursuant to.. .the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2675(a)." Brief of Amicus Curiae National Congress of American Indians at 28, Lara (No. 03-107).
179. The Supreme Court has stated that Congress's "broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian
tribes," Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1633, are "drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself." Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) (emphasis added). In Lara, the Court identified the Indian Commerce
Clause, treaties made between the United States and various tribes, and "preconstitutional powers necessarily
inherent in any Federal Government," as possible sources of Congress's powers over Indians. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at
1634; see also id. at 1633-34.
180. In a concurring opinion in Lara, Justice Thomas, describing federal Indian policy as "schizophrenic,"
124 S. Ct. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment), expressed his view that "[t]he Federal Government cannot
simultaneously claim power to regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes through ordinary domestic legislation
and also maintain that the tribes possess anything resembling 'sovereignty."' Id. at 1648.
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A. The Great Sioux Nation
Indian tribes may be able to overcome the limitations on their jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians by forming intertribal confederacies or other intertribal
governing bodies. The sixteen modem day tribes of the Great Sioux Nation18" ' are
attempting to do just that.
The Great Sioux Nation is a confederacy of historically and culturally united
tribes. 8 2 Its members are divided by dialects into three divisions: the Dakota
(Santee), the Nakota (Yankton), and the Lakota (Teton). The names Dakota, Nakota,
and Lakota mean "considered friends,"' 183 and together the three divisions form the
"alliance of friends."'18 4 The bonds between members of the Great Sioux Nation are
centuries old.
85
The historic governing body of the Great Sioux Nation was the Oceti Sakowin,
or the "Seven Council Fires."' 186 Members of all three divisions were represented by
their chiefs. The assembly "symbolized the cohesiveness of the Nation."'87
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the tribes of the Sioux Nation
maintained their national unity. Together, the Lakota, Dakota, and Nakota fought
the Powder River War and caused the United States to enter the Fort Laramie Treaty
of 1868.188 After the United States took the Black Hills in violation of the Treaty of
181. These tribes, listed alphabetically, are as follows: the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck, the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, the Lower Brule
Sioux Tribe, the Lower Sioux Indian Community, the Oglala Sioux Tribe, the Prairie Island, the Rosebud Sioux
Tribe, the Santee Sioux Tribe, the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota
Nation, the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the Upper Sioux Indian Community, and the
Yankton Sioux Tribe.
182. JAMES R. WALKER, LAKOTA SOCIETY 15 (Raymond J. DeMallie ed., 1982); see also Herbert T. Hoover,
Sioux Federation, in NATIVE AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 600 (Mary B. Davis ed.,
1994).
183. Id. at 14.
184. EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE: THE Sioux NATION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES,
1775 TO THE PRESENT 4 (1991).
185. SAMUEL W. POND, THE DAKOTA OR SIOUX IN MINNESOTA AS THEY WERE IN 1834, at 4 (1986).
186. WALKER, supra note 182, at 15. The name Oceti Sakowin is a contraction of the phrase Octetiyotipi
Sakowin, which means "Seven Council Fires." Id. The Dakota, also known as the Santee or Isanti ("Stone Knife
People"), comprise four of the seven Council Fires: the Mdewakanton ("People of Spirit Lake"), the Sisitonwan
("People of the Swamp"), the Wahpekute ("Leaf Shooters"), and the Wahpetonwan ("Dwellers among the Leaves").
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 590 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1996). The Nakota, also known as the
Yankton or Yanktonai, comprise two additional Council Fires: the Ihanktonwan ("Campers at the End") and the
Ihanktonwanna ("Little Campers at the End"). 1d. The Assiniboines ("Cook with Stones"), although not one of the
original Seven Council Fires, later became associated with the Nakota. Id. The Lakota, also known as the Teton
("People of the Prairie") or Pte Oyate ("Buffalo People"), are the Seventh Council Fire, and they, in turn, are com-
prised of seven subdivisions or bands: the Hunkpapas ("Those Who Camp at the Entrance"), the Itazipcos ("Without
Bows" or "Sans Arcs"), the Miniconjou ("Those Who Plant by the Stream"), the Oglala ("Scatter One's Own"),
the Oohenumpas ("Two Boilings" or "Two Kettles"), the Sichangu ("Burnt Thighs"), and the Siha Sapas ("Black
Feet"). Id. at 591.
187. ROYAL B. HASSRICK, THE SIOUX: LIFE AND CUSTOMS OF A WARRIOR SOCIETY 7 (1964).
188. Treaty with the Sioux-Brul6, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle,
Sans Arcs, and Santee and Arapaho, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, 635 (1869), reprinted in II CHARLES J. KAPPLER: INDIAN
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 998 (1904). The Treaty, which was signed by representatives of all three divisions
of the Sioux Nation, set aside nearly all of South Dakota west of the Missouri River as the "permanent home" of
the Sioux Nation. Id. art. 15. That treaty was understood by contemporary observers as one in which "the [U.S.]
government ha[d]... negotiated a peace conceding everything demanded by the enemy and exacting nothing in
return." United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 376 n.4 (quoting D. ROBINSON, A HISTORY OF THE DAKOTA OR
SIOUX INDIANS 356-81 (1904), reprinted in 2 SOUTH DAKOTA HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS (1904)). The United
States later intruded the territory of the Sioux Nation in violation of the Treaty of 1868. The Nation gathered at Little
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1868,89 all three divisions of the Sioux Nation fought for redress for over a century,
eventually winning the largest Indian claims judgment ever awarded against the
United States."9 The tribes of the Sioux Nation have twice come together to defeat
state claims tojurisdiction in Indian country. 9' Although divided on separate reserva-
tions1 92 (see Map 1193), the tribes still function, in a very real sense, as a confederacy.
MONTANA NFt. ,pwtL."
SOUTH Upe- smmx ii Lake (Shakopee)
WYOMING Pi - ,-k "l IOWA
Map 1. Contemporary Sioux Reservations in the United States
Big Horn to defend its people and its lands. Sitting Bull was recognized as the head chief of the encampment at
Little Big Horn. Sitting Bull and the Sioux defeated Custer and his army in the so-called "Great Sioux War," and,
thereafter, the United States entered an Agreement with "the Sioux Nation of Indians," wherein Congress pledged
to "secure to them an orderly government." Act of Feb. 28, 1877 (19 Stat. 254). The Supreme Court later ruled that
the form of government pledged to the Sioux Nation was "the highest and best of all--that of self-government."
Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883).
189. In the Act of 1877, the United States took the Black Hills and other Sioux Nation hunting lands. Act of
Feb. 28, 1877 (19 Stat. 254).
190. In 1978, Congress authorized the Sioux Nation to sue the United States to determine "whether or not
the United States took the Black Hills area from the Sioux Nation in violation of the Fifth amendment of the
Constitution... House Rep. 95-529, 1978 U.S.C.A.A.N. 433; see Pub. L. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153 (1978). In the
ensuing litigation, the Supreme Court recognized that, "[flor over a century now, the Sioux Nation has claimed that
the United States unlawfully abrogated" the Treaty of 1868 by taking the Black Hills, and upheld the largest Indian
claims judgment ever awarded. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 374. The tribes of the Sioux Nation stand
together in refusing this money judgment and continuing to seek the return of the Black Hills. LAZARUS, supra note
184, 427-28. The value of the judgment, with interest, now exceeds $570 million. See Frederic J. Frommer, Sioux
Indians Want Land, Not Millions; Impoverished Tribe Won't Settle for Government Ownership of Black Hills,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2001, at A2.
191. In the 1960s, the tribes of the Sioux Nation united to defeat a South Dakota referendum asserting state
jurisdiction over reservations under Public Law 280, supra note 174. The Rosebud, Oglala, Standing Rock, and
Cheyenne River Sioux tribes preserved that victory when the State sought to assert jurisdiction over state highways
running through Indian country. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. State of South Dakota, 900 F.2d 1164 (1900), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 915 (1991).
192. The Act of 1889 divided what remained of the Great Sioux Reservation into separate reservations. Act
of Mar. 2, 1889 (25 Stat. 888). Lands outside those six reservations were ceded upon consent of two-thirds of the
adult males of the "the different bands of the Sioux Nation of Indians." Id. § 28.
193. Adapted from NATIVE AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 182, at 600. This map depicts
the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota as it was before the Supreme Court ruled in 1998 that Congress
intended to diminish the reservation's boundaries when, in 1894, it enacted legislation authorizing the sale of tribal
lands. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); see Act of Aug. 15, 1894 (28 Stat. 286).
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In the constitutions of the various Sioux tribes, adopted under the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934P 4 and approved by the Secretary of the Interior, the
tribes acknowledged that they would continue to meet in their "National Sioux
Council."' 95 In 1994, various tribes of the Sioux Nation established the Dakota
Territory Chairmen's Council (DTCC), an inter-tribal legislative body that serves
as the modem day National Sioux Council. Thirteen Sioux tribes have signed onto
the charter of the DTCC,'96 as have three non-Sioux tribes. 9 7 All three divisions of
the Sioux Nation are represented in the DTCC. Elected tribal leaders represent their
people at Council meetings to discuss and resolve matters of national concern. The
DTCC has developed resolutions, compacts, and accords on intertribal issues.
The Sioux tribes have resolved to create a Sioux Nation Supreme Court, which
will serve as the highest appellate court for many, if not all, of the constituent tribes
of the Sioux Nation.'98 The DTCC has been instrumental in the tribes' efforts to
create the court,' as has been the Wakpa Sica Historical Society. 20° In 2000,
Congress passed legislation authorizing the creation of a Sioux Nation Judicial
Support Center and Sioux Nation Supreme Court.2 ' Among other things, Congress
194. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2000) (codifying 48 Stat. 984).
195. See, e.g., CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX CONST. & BY-LAws, art. XIf (Dec. 27, 1935).
196. The tribes are as follows: the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, the Flandreau
Santee Sioux Tribe, the Lower Sioux Indian Community, the Oglala Sioux Tribe, the Prairie Island Sioux
Community, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Tribe, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota
Nation, the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe (ND), the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the Upper Sioux Indian Community
(MN), and the Yankton Sioux Tribe. See Dakota Territory Chairmen's Council Charter (on file with author).
197. The tribes are as follows: the Ponca Tribe, the Three Affiliated Tribes (Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara)
of the Fort Berthold Reservation, and the Turtle Mountain Chippewa. See DTCC Charter, supra note 196.
198. The supreme court is designed to address problems created by the division of the Sioux Nation into
separate tribes. Although united by tradition, history, culture, and now the DTCC, the various Sioux tribes occupy
separate reservations and have separate and distinct legal systems. At present, the tribes lack a judicial forum for
resolution of cases and controversies of inter-tribal importance.
199. Pursuant to its charter, the DTCC has the authority to establish such a court: "If the need arises to provide
greater uniformity in the application and the enforcement of the acts, resolutions, and compacts of the Dakota
Territory Chairmen's Council, the Dakota Territory Chairmen's Council may propose to establish the supreme court
of the Dakota Territory." DTCC Charter, supra note 196, art. VI, § 3 (on file with author). Ratification by a majority
of the individual Sioux tribes in the DTCC is required to establish the supreme court, and only those tribes that ratify
the court will be subject to its jurisdiction. Id.
200. The Wakpa Sica Historical Society has been described as
a group of interested and committed local individuals, both Indian and non-Indian, from in and
around the Fort Pierre, South Dakota area who have been interested, for almost a decade, in
seeking to initiate a project committed to the theme of reconciliation and building on the largely
peaceful commercial and cultural exchange of the nineteenth century between Indians and non-
Indians within the territory of the Great Sioux Nation.
Frank Pommersheim, Looking Forward and Looking Back: The Promise and Potential of a Sioux National Judicial
Support Center and a Sioux Nation Supreme Court, 34 AIZ. ST. L.J. 269, 270 n.2 (2002). For a report of the
Society's efforts to aid in the creation of the Sioux Nation Supreme Court, see Frank Pommersheim & John P.
Lavelle, Wakpa Sica Historical Society Reconciliation Place Project: Intermediate Planning and Recommendation
Report(2000), available at http./www.wakpasica.org/pdf.files/2000usd_und report.pdf (last visited Sept. 5,2004);
Frank Pommersheim & John P. Lavelle, Wakpa Sica Historical Society Reconciliation Place Project: Intermediate
Planning and Development Report for a Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center and Supreme Court (2002) [herein-
after Wakpa Sica Intermediate Planning and Development Report], available at http://www.wakpasica.orglpdf_
filesI2002_usd-report-summary.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2004); and Frank Pommersheim & John P. LaVelle,
Toward a Great Sioux National Judicial Support Center and Supreme Court: An Interim Planning and Recommen-
dation Report for the Wakpa Sica Historical Society's Reconciliation Place Project, 17 WICAZO SA REV. 183
(2002).
201. Wakpa Sica Reconciliation Place, Omnibus Indian Advancement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-568, 114
Stat. 2903.
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has authorized funding to aid in the "development and operation of the Sioux Nation
Tribal Supreme Court, '20 2 which will be located on off-reservation tribal trust land
in Fort Pierre, South Dakota. °3
Once formed, the Sioux Nation Supreme Court will serve many important
purposes. It will draw upon the historic unity of the Sioux Nation to promote
intertribal justice and to resolve issues affecting the entire Sioux Nation.2° It has
been said that the "creation of a Sioux Nation Supreme Court... will add a valuable
layer of judicial review and support to the existing tribal judiciaries (including
appellate courts) of the participating tribes. 2°5 The court "seeks to join together
historically and culturally connected tribes in a way that is consistent with pre-
contact affiliation and relatedness. 20 6
Through the creation of the DTCC and Sioux Nation Supreme Court, the
constituent tribes of the Sioux Nation are renewing their confederated, national
government. If realized, the Sioux national government will expand the jurisdiction
of all sixteen modem day Sioux tribes to include all Sioux Indians, regardless of
their individual tribal affiliations. All Sioux Indians will be members of the Sioux
national government and will have a full right to participate in that government. The
inclusion of all Indians within the self-government of the Sioux Nation will provide
a basis for all Sioux tribes to exercise jurisdiction over all Sioux Indians. 20 7
With renewed jurisdiction over all Sioux Indians, each Sioux tribe will be able
to recognize and enforce foreign judgments against Sioux Indians. For example, if
in the hypothetical presented in part fI.B, supra, Adams and Baker were members
of sister Sioux tribes, Baker would be able to enforce her $1,000,000 judgment
against Adams in the courts of any Sioux tribe.
The Sioux tribes may utilize full faith and credit or comity to recognize and
enforce the judgments of each other's tribal courts. The choice rests with the tribes
themselves. Full faith and credit would involve a significant cession of independ-
ence and authority by each tribe, while comity would preserve the right of each tribe
202. Id. § 412(a).
203. The land consists of thirteen acres donated by Stanley County, South Dakota, to the Wakpa Sica
Historical Society and placed in trust for the Sioux Nation. Frank Pommersheim, Reconciliation Place Project Will
Foster Understanding Between Races, ARGUS LEADER, Feb. 10, 2002, at 13B. The Sioux Nation Supreme Court
will be housed in a 66,000 square-foot complex on this land called the "Wakpa Sica Reconciliation Place." Terry
Woster, Tribes Bless Center for Culture, Justice, ARGUS LEADER, July 11, 2002, at 1B. The complex will also be
home to a cultural center, an interpretive center, and a mediation office. Id. The first stage of the project, the cultural
center, is scheduled to be completed in 2004. Id.
204. According to the DTCC:
The Court will draw upon and maintain the historic unity of the tribes of the Sioux Nation in
order to promote inter-tribal justice in today's world and to resolve issues affecting the entire
Sioux Nation. The Court will strengthen the competency of the tribal court systems of the
constituent tribes and increase public confidence in those courts. It will also provide a forum for
conflict resolution between the constituent tribes on issues of inter-tribal importance; establish
uniform principles of common law linking traditional customs with modem law in a culturally
meaningful way; uniformly apply the legislative enactments, compacts, and accords of the
DTCC; and foster inter-tribal collaboration in the creation of laws dealing with issues of inter-
tribal importance, such as child custody and domestic violence.
Dakota Territory Chairmen's Council Resolution (1994) (on file with author).
205. Wakpa Sica Intermediate Planning and Development Report, supra note 200, at 4-5.
206. Id.
207. Cf Duro, 495 U.S. at 694.
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to refuse recognition to a sister Sioux tribal court order in the event, unlikely as it
might be, that the order offended the public policy of the enforcing tribe. Policy
conflicts between tribes could be reduced considerably through enactment of
intertribal resolutions expressing common Sioux policy regarding select issues or
remedies. °8
The creation of a confederate government uniting all Sioux tribes involves both
the alteration of the governmental structure of each existing tribe and a cession of
power by those tribes to the new, confederated tribal authority.2°9 Both measures
arguably would require the amendment of each tribe's constitution, which in turn
may require the approval of the Secretary of the Interior and approval by a majority
of adult tribal members voting in tribal referenda." ' Separate federal recognition of
the national, confederate Sioux government may also be required, unless the
confederacy can be created by amending the existing constitutions of the sixteen
federally recognized Sioux tribes. In the case of the Sioux, one may argue that the
national Sioux government has historically been recognized by Congress and the
Executive Branch and affirmed by the Judiciary. 1
B. The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe
The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is a confederate tribal government similar to that
which the Sioux Nation strives to renew and formalize. The Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe 212 that serves as the central governing
body for six constituent Chippewa (or Ojibwe 213) bands. Each band occupies its own
reservation and has been separately recognized by the federal government. 2' 4 The
208. Alternately, the tribes could impose full faith and credit selectively, only in respect to those matters over
which there is no inter-tribal public policy conflict.
209. The extent of the cession depends on the needs and desires of the confederated tribes.
210. Such requirements have been hallmarks of federal legislation allowing tribes to alter the structures of
their governments, see, e.g., Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476(a)(1), or to cede tribal jurisdiction to the
states, see, e.g., Public Law 280, 25 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal law provides that tribes organized under the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA) may amend their constitutions with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, by
majority vote of adult tribal members, provided that the total vote cast is at least thirty percent of all eligible voters.
25 U.S.C. § 476(a)(1); 25 C.F.R. § 81.7. Federal law also provides that the Secretary of the Interior has the power
to approve (or disapprove) amendments to the constitutions of non-IRA tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 2. The requirement of
secretarial approval of tribal constitutional amendments has been criticized as a "significant obstacle to true Indian
self-determination." Timothy W. Joranko & Mark C. Van Norman, Indian Self-Determination at Bay: Secretarial
Authority to Disapprove Tribal Constitutional Amendments, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 81, 84 (1993/1994).
211. All three branches of the federal government have recognized the continuing existence of the Sioux
Nation. The Supreme Court did so in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, and in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). Id. at 589. Congress recognized the Sioux Nation in the Treaty of 1868, the Act of
1877, the Act of 1889, and the 1978 legislation authorizing the nation to sue the United States over the taking of
the Black Hills. See supra notes 188-192 and accompanying text. The executive branch, through the Secretary of
the Interior, continues to recognize the existence of a Sioux national government. See supra note 195 and
accompanying text.
212. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,180, 68,182 (Dec. 5, 2003).
213. The name Ojibwe "is generally interpreted as 'To Roast Till Puckered Up,' referring to the puckered
seams of moccasins.... Chippewa, widely used in treaties and other official documents, is a corruption of the early
spellings Ojibway or Otchipwe." Paulette Fairbanks Moulin, Ojibway in Minnesota, in NATIVE AMERICA IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 398 (Mary B. Davis ed., 1994). Today, the names Ojibwe and Chippewa
are both used.
214. Id.
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six member bands are the Bois Forte Band of Chippewa Indians, the Fond du Lac
Band, the Grand Portage Chippewa, the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, the Mille Lacs
Band of Ojibwe, and the White Earth Nation. (See Map 2.215) The strength of their
union is reflected in the maxim of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe: "Ni-Mah-Mah-
Wi-No-Min," meaning, "We all come together."
Map 2. Contemporary Chippewa Reservations in Minnesota
The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe describes its formation, constitution, and powers
as follows:
In response to the need for a central Tribal government, the various Bands of
Chippewa Indians residing within the Fond du Lac, Grand Portage, Bois Forte,
Leech Lake, Mille Lacs, and White Earth Reservations united to form the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe was established on
June 18, 1934. The structure and Constitution adopted for the governance of the
Tribe was recognized by the Secretary of the Interior on July 24, 1936, pursuant
to the authority granted by the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984. Status
as a Tribal Government provides the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe with broad
powers, ensuring various immunities for the Tribe and its individual members.
Powers include those of self-governance granted by the Indian Reorganization
Act. Immunities include the right to be free from State interference within the
six member reservations .... All governmental powers of the Minnesota Chip-
pewa Tribe are delegated by its Constitution to the Tribal Executive Committee
215. Adapted from Native America in the Twentieth Century, supra note 182, at 397. The Red Lake Band
of Chippewa Indians, the seventh and final Chippewa tribe in Minnesota, is not a member of the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe. Id. at 398.
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and the respective Reservation Tribal Councils. While the Constitution of the
Tribe recognizes the autonomy of the individual reservations over property and
other matters solely affecting a single reservation, the Constitution also grants
the Tribal Executive Committee broad powers over tribal property and affairs.
In essence, each member of the Tribe has dual membership: tribal [in the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe] and reservation [in one of the six constituent bands].
The constitutional distribution of powers reflects this fact.216
Under its constitution, the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe has formed a court of appeals,
which has jurisdiction over select appeals from the courts of the six bands based on
grants of jurisdiction from the bands.
The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is a "representative group that governs all eligible
Minnesota Chippewa Indians."2 7 Members of each of the six constituent bands elect
representatives to the tribe, which, in turn, is vested with significant authority to
govern the affairs of the bands and their members:
The six member reservations of the MCT sought a single consolidated tribal
government without relinquishing governance at the local level. Each member
reservation elects its own tribal council, generally called a Reservation Business
Committee, which governs locally as well as provides representation to the
consolidated organization, which is governed by a Tribal Executive Committee.
The MCT governing body has the power to administer funds, manage tribal
resources, enter into contracts with individuals or organizations, pass laws
regulating the use of lands under its jurisdiction, and conduct other business to
promote the interests of tribal members.218
The existence of an intertribal, national Chippewa government expands the
jurisdiction of each constituent Chippewa band to include all Chippewa Indians:
[S]ince the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe governs all the reservations in Minne-
sota, a Chippewa Indian who is enrolled as a member of the Leech Lake Band
would be placed in the same membership category as an enrolled member of the
White Earth Band. Under this scenario, all Chippewa Indians who are enrolled
at their respective local reservations are in fact members of a larger entity, and
as such would be considered "member" Indians for jurisdiction purposes.219
This expansion of jurisdiction opens the door for effective intertribal enforcement
of tribal court orders against Chippewa band members. As yet, the Chippewa bands
have not adopted uniform laws concerning the enforcement of tribal court judgments
across reservation borders. For example, the White Earth band employs comity in
its enforcement of the judgments of other tribal courts, including other Chippewa
216. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, A Brief History (2000), available at http://www.mnchippewatribe.org/a-
brief.history.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2004); see Minn. Chippewa Tribe, Revised Const. & By-Laws (Nov. 6,
1972), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/chippewa-constandbylaws.htm (last visited May
6, 2004).
217. Emmerson H. Ward, Sovereignty Revisited: The Dilemma with State Jurisdiction over Nonmember
Indians in State v. R.M.H., 617 N.W.2d 55 (Minn. 2000), 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 251, 283 (2001).
218. Moulin, supra note 213, at 398.
219. Id.
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courts,22° while the Mille Lacs Band employs full faith and credit.22 ' However, the
potential exists for the enactment of such uniform laws and the development of a
model system for cross-boundary enforcement of tribal court decisions.
C. Other Intertribal Governing Bodies
Other groups of historically aligned tribes have united in the formation of
intertribal governing bodies. Among them are the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois)
Confederacy, which traditionally has united the Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida,
Mohawk, Seneca, and Tuscarora Nations in New York State;222 the Intertribal
Council of the Five Civilized Tribes (ICFCT), which unites the Chickasaw,
Choctaw, Cherokee, Muscogee (Creek), and Seminole Nations in Oklahoma;223 and
the All Indian Pueblo Council (AIPC) in New Mexico, which unites the nineteen
Indian Pueblos in New Mexico. 24
The extent to which these bodies function as centralized governments for their
member tribes varies considerably. For example, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy
served for centuries as the centralized government for the Six Iroquois Nations.
Historically, each nation retained authority to manage its own affairs, while the
Haudenosaunee Grand Council, comprised of representatives from all six nations,
legislated on matters of intertribal importance. 22' However, the governments of the
Mohawks, Oneidas, and Senecas no longer participate fully in the Grand Council,
22 6
and increasing factionalism between and among the Six Nations 227 has caused some
220. See supra note 81.
221. See supra note 113.
222. For detailed descriptions of the Haudenosaunee and its historic and contemporary structure, see Official
Homepage of the Haudenosaunee, at http://sixnations.buffnet.net (last visited July 12, 2004); Symposium, Law,
Sovereignty, and Tribal Governance: The Iroquois Confederacy, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 799 (1998); and DONALD. A.
GRINDE, JR., & BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, EXEMPLAR OF LIBERTY: NATIVE AMERICA AND THE EVOLUTION OF
DEMOCRACY (1991).
223. The ICFCT was formed in 1949 and continues to function today. See ICFCT, History of the Inter-tribal
Council of the Five Civilized Tribes, available at http://www.fivecivilizedtribes.org/itchist.asp (last visited Sept.
5, 2004).
224. The AJPC, described as an "ancient cooperative body of the Pueblo people," has struggled for centuries
to protect the rights of Pueblo Indians from encroachment by non-Indians. See JOE S. SANDO, PUEBLO NATIONS:
EIGHT CENTURIES OF PUEBLO INDIAN HISTORY 97 (1992). For a brief history of the AIPC, see id. at 263.
225. Brian Patterson, Preserving the Oneida Nation Culture, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 121, 121 n. 1 (2000).
The Grand Council continues to address issues of concern to the people of all six nations. See Robert B. Porter,
Building a New Longhouse: The Case for Government Reform within the Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee, 46
BUFF. L. REV. 805, 883-88 (1998); see also Haudenosaunee Six Nations of Iroquois (Confederacy) of N. Am. v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 98-CV-01 12E(H), 1999 WL 528822 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (suit brought by
Haudenosaunee to redress alleged violations of Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909).
226. Unlike the Onondaga, Cayuga, and Tuscarora Nations, which "have maintained undivided participation
in the Confederacy," the Mohawks, Oneidas, and Senecas have "developed alternative forms of government."
Porter, supra note 225, at 884. These alternative governments are "not considered part of the Grand Council." Id.
at 885. They include "the Seneca Nation of Indians, the Mohawk Tribal Council, the People's government of
Akwesasne, the Oneida Nation government of Ray Halbritter and Six Nations Band Council at Ohsweken, the
Oneida Band Council at Southwold, the elected Mohawk governments at Oka, Deseronto, Gibson, Cornwall Island
and Kanawake and Oneida Nation of Wisconsin." Id. at 884-85.
227. The fact that the alternative governments of the Mohawks, Oneidas, and Senecas operate outside the
Confederacy has "generated considerable friction over the years." Id. at 885. Indeed, it has been said that "[flaction-
alism, rather than nationalism, has become the defining characteristic of modern Haudenosaunee society." Id. at
888-89.
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skeptics to question the vitality of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy in its present
21state.
By contrast, the All Indian Pueblo Council enjoys broad support from its
members but has limited legislative authority. Among other things, it has the power
to conduct educational campaigns, negotiate with other governments, promote and
foster programs for the benefit of the member pueblos, apply for loans and grants,
and "do whatever else may be necessary or desirable to promote the general welfare
of any or all member-pueblos. 2 29 But the Council's constitution expressly provides
that, "[i]n carrying out these powers, the All Indian Pueblo Council and officers will
not interfere with the self-government of any member-pueblo. '230 Thus, it is not at
all clear that the Council unites its members under a single, confederated govern-
ment or that it expands the jurisdictional reach of each pueblo to include the
members of every other pueblo. The Council, as presently constituted, does not
appear to involve a delegation of jurisdiction or governmental authority from each
member pueblo to the central body.
Other tribes have delegated their inherent jurisdiction to various intertribal
governing bodies. There are several intertribal courts in the United States, including
the Intertribal Court of California (ICC),231 Northern Plains Intertribal Court of
Appeals (NPICA),232 and Southwest Intertribal Court of Appeals (SWITCA),233 each
of which operates through an express delegation of jurisdiction from its member
tribes.234 In addition, various tribes have delegated their own governing authority to
228. Professor Porter has noted that the Haudenosaunee Confederacy is "afflicted with.. .a great degree of
division and dysfunction." Id. at 890. This has contributed, in Porter's view, to an erosion of traditional
Haudenosaunee law, the weakening of tribal government, and a loss of sovereignty. See id. at 912-26. Porter has
proposed substantial reforms to the Haudenosaunee government. See id. at 936-45.
229. ALL INDIAN PUEBLO COUNCIL CONST. art. IV, § I (a)-(j), reprinted in SANDO, supra note 224, at 265-68.
230. ALL INDIAN PUEBLO COUNCIL CONST. art. IV, § 2, supra note 229, at 266.
231. The ICC serves the following nine tribes in California: the Cahto Tribe of Laytonville Rancheria, the
Coyote Valley Rancheria, the Dry Creek Rancheria, the Guidiville Indian Rancheria, the Lytton Rancheria, the
Pinoleville Indian Reservation, the Redwood Valley Reservation, the Sherwood Valley Rancheria, and the Stewarts
Point Rancheria. See http://www.intertribalcourt.indian.com (last visited July 12, 2004). The court describes itself
as one of "limited jurisdiction authorized by an intertribal governing agreement." Id. The court "will exercise
jurisdiction over cases involving on-reservation housing disputes (eviction cases) and cases involving the welfare
of the children of member tribes. The enrolled members of the consortium tribes and other interested parties may
also submit cases to the court mediation services for resolution." Id.
232. The NPICA serves as an appellate court for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, and other plains tribes. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438, 444 (1997) (noting that respondent appealed unfavorable ruling of Fort Berthold tribal court to NPICA);
Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, Codes of Law § 21-02-01 (1998), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.
org/ccfolder/sisseton-wahpeton-codeoflaw2 I.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2004) (providing that NPICA shall serve
as one of tribe's two appellate courts).
233. The SWITCA serves various tribes in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. Tribes participate
on a voluntary basis, referring cases to the court at their discretion. See American Indian Law Center, Southwest
Intertribal Court of Appeals, available at http://lawschool.unm.edu/AILC/switca (About SWITCA) (last visited
Sept. 5, 2004). Each participating tribe may use the court as "(1) an independent court of last resort which exercises
the appellate powers of the tribe; (2) an independent appellate court which issues advisory opinions, only; or (3)
an independent intermediate appellate court from which any party may appeal to a higher court as defined by the
joining tribe." AILC, Southwest Intertribal Court of Appeals, available at http://lawschool.unm.edu/AILC/switca
(last visited Sept. 5, 2004).
234. Although not itself a court, the Northwest Intertribal Court System (NICS) is an intertribal organization
that provides court services and personnel to the individual tribal courts of its members in the Puget Sound Region
of the Pacific Northwest. See O'Connor, supra note 57 at 4. The member tribes of the NICS (listed alphabetically)
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intertribal commissions of their own creation. For example, the Yakama, Umatilla,
Nez Perce, and Warms Springs Tribes have delegated their authority to manage their
treaty-protected salmon fisheries to the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commis-
sion, an intertribal government organization that consists of the fish and wildlife
committees of its member tribes.235 In the 1980s, the United States, Idaho, Oregon,
and Washington granted the Commission primary responsibility for the enforcement
of federal, state, and tribal laws governing treaty fisheries and non-Indian fisheries
on- and off-reservation, thus significantly "extending the reach of tribal sover-
eignty. ' 2
36
These intertribal bodies suggest the willingness of tribes to unite for common
purposes. For intertribal governments, the whole is often greater than the sum of the
parts. That is to say, while such unions may involve a reduction in individual tribal
autonomy, they have the potential to enhance the collective sovereignty of the united
tribes.
The formation of intertribal governing bodies may prove to be an effective means
for tribes to reassert their authority over members of allied and affiliated tribes, thus
providing a basis for the enforcement of tribal laws, and tribal court judgments,
across reservation boundaries.
V. INTERTRIBAL RECIPROCITY COMPACTS
In Duro v. Reina, the Court held that tribes did not, under then prevailing federal
Indian policy, have the inherent authority to prosecute nonmember Indians for
crimes committed within their territories.237 However, the Court was careful to note
that "[o]ur decision here also does not address the ability of neighboring tribal
governments that share law enforcement concerns to enter into reciprocal
agreements giving each jurisdiction over the other's members. 238 For those tribes
that do not wish to enter into intertribal governing bodies, reciprocal agreements of
the type the Court suggests may be one of the last, best options for Indian tribes to
assert and preserve their authority over all Indians within their boundaries.
Such agreements involve the reciprocal delegation between tribes of each tribe's
inherent authority over its own members. Despite the limits placed on tribal
jurisdiction by Congress and the courts, it has never been doubted that tribes retain
broad powers of inherent sovereignty over their own members.2 39 Nor can it be
are as follows: the Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation (the Chehalis Tribe), the Jamestown S'Klallam
Indian Tribe, the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, the Port Gamble S'Klallam Indian Tribe, the Sauk-Suiattle Indian
Tribe, the Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe, the Skokomish Indian Tribe, the Stillaguamish Indian Tribe, and the Tulalip
Indian Tribe. See NICS, Membership Information, available at http://www.nics.ws/membershiplink.html (last
visited July 12, 2004).
235. HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, HONORING NATIONS: TRIBAL
GOVERNANCE SUCCESS STORIES 9-10 (2002).
236. id. at 12.
237. Duro, 495 U.S. at 691,694.
238. Id. at 697. It is not clear what the Court meant by "neighboring tribal governments," since few
reservations adjoin one another. See, e.g., Maps I and 2, supra. However, there is no reason to believe that non-
neighboring tribes cannot enter into agreements concerning the reciprocal delegation of jurisdiction over their
members.
239. See, e.g., Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
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doubted that tribes, like other sovereigns, can, with the consent of their members,
delegate those powers to other governments, including other tribal governments.
Intertribal reciprocity compacts may be appropriate for tribes that share common
histories and values. For example, each of the sixteen modern day Sioux tribes
acknowledges the reciprocal jurisdiction of every other Sioux tribe over its tribal
members. As one Rosebud Sioux Tribal Council Representative explained:
There is unanimity among Sioux tribes that members of other Sioux tribes within
their territory are subject to tribal self-government, including tribal criminal
jurisdiction. Accordingly, just as our sister Sioux tribes respect our tribal self-
government authority over their members within the Rosebud Sioux Reserva-
tion, we respect the corresponding authority of sister Sioux tribes over our tribal
members within their territory.2"
Other groups of tribes, including those without long histories of kinship,
alliances, or unity, have also come together to develop uniform policies regarding
the reciprocal, inter-jurisdictional enforcement of tribal court orders. Indeed, in the
area of domestic violence, thirteen Sioux tribes and three non-Sioux tribes, including
the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 24' have begun working together to
"develop uniform laws and policies for all the tribes regarding the mandatory arrest
and prosecution of primary aggressors in domestic violence cases.''242 The tribes
have also worked together to develop and implement "a computer network to link
all the tribes" in order to assist tribal courts and law enforcement agencies in
enforcing protection orders across reservation boundaries.243 The Sioux and
Chippewa were historic enemies, having fought one another for the rich hunting
grounds of the northern plains. 2"4
Throughout the United States, tribes have united in numerous intertribal councils,
associations, and organizations. Many of these coalitions are based on traditional
alliances and shared histories, while others are based on geographic proximity or
contemporary exigencies. Together they include the Affiliated Tribes of Northwest
Indians (ATNI),241 the Alabama Intertribal Council (AIC),246 the Alaska Inter-Tribal
240. Affidavit of Paul Valandra in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Viken, No. CIV-94-3039 (D.S.D. filed Oct. 3,
1994) (on file with author).
241. The sixteen tribes in question are the member tribes of the Dakota Territory Chairmen's Council, listed
supra at notes 196 and 197. See Office of Justice Programs, ENSURING PUBLIC SAFETY AND JUSTICE IN RURAL
AMERICA 12 (1998), available at http:llwww.ojp.usdoj.govlreports/98Guidesrural (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Indeed, the name "Sioux," given to the Lakota, Dakota, and Nakota by French fur traders, was derived
from the Chippewa name for these Indians, "nadoueissiouw," which means "little snakes." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 590 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1996).
245. The ATNI is a nonprofit organization representing fifty-four northwest tribal governments from Oregon,
Idaho, Washington, southeast Alaska, Nevada, Northern California, and Western Montana. See http://www.
atnitribes.org (last visited July 12, 2004).
246. The member tribes of the AIC are as follows: the Cherokees of Northeast Alabama, the Cherokees of
Southeast Alabama, the Echota Cherokee Tribe of Alabama, the MaChis Lower Creek Indian Tribe, the Mowa Band
of Choctaws, and the Star Clan of Muscogee Creeks. See http://www.members.aol.com/aicwia/wp3.html (last
visited July 12, 2004).
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Council (AITC),2 47 the Council of Energy Resources Tribes (CERT),2 48 the Great
Lakes Intertribal Council (GLIC),2 49 the Intertribal Council of Arizona (ICA),2 10 the
Intertribal Council of Louisiana (ICL),251 the Inter-Tribal Council of Michigan
(ITCM),252 the Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada (ITCN),253 the Midwest Alliance of
Sovereign Tribes (MWALST), the Montana-Wyoming Tribal Leaders Council
(MWTLC),254 the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI),255 the Southern
247. The AITC is a statewide, tribally governed non-profit organization that advocates on behalf of Alaska
Native tribal governments. See http://www.aitc.org/aitcaboutus.htm (last visited July 12, 2004).
248. Founded in 1975, CERT is a tribal organization governed by the elected tribal leadership of forty-eight
federally recognized Indian tribes in the United States and four affiliated Canadian bands. Its programs and services
include public policy research and advocacy, technical assistance to member tribes, environmental and water quality
studies, and educational campaigns. See Official Homepage of CERT, at http://www.certredearth.com (last visited
July 12, 2004).
249. The GLIC includes twelve member tribes as follows: the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians, the Forest County Potawatomi Community, the Ho-Chunk Nation, the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians, the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, the Lac Vieux Desert Tribe
of Michigan, the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, the St. Croix
Chippewa Tribe, the Sokaogon Chippewa Tribe (Mole Lake), and the Stockbridge-Munsee Indians of Wisconsin.
See http://www.glitc.org (last visited July 12, 2004).
250. The ICA, comprised of the chairpersons, presidents, and governors of nineteen tribes in Arizona,
provides technical assistance and policy support to member tribes, including the Ak-Chin Indian Community, the
Cocopah Indian Tribe, the Colorado River Indian Tribe, the Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation, the Fort Mohave Tribe,
the Gila River Indian Community, the Havasupai Tribe, the Hopi Tribe, the Hualapai Tribe, the Kaibab-Paiute
Tribe, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, the Quechan Tribe, the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, the San Carlos
Apache Tribe, the San Juan Southern Paiute, the Tohono O'odham Nation, the Tonto Apache Tribe, the White
Mountain Apache Tribe, the Yavapai-Apache Nation, and the Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe. See http://www.
itcaonline.com (last visited July 12, 2004).
251. The member tribes of the ICL include the Chitimacha, the Coushatta, the Jena Band of Choctaw, the
Tunica-Biloxi, and the United Houma Nation. See Sarah Sue Goldsmith, Intertribal CouncilAssists Member Tribes,
BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE MAGAZINE, June 30, 1996.
252. The ITCM, originally founded in 1966, is a "state chartered 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization consisting
of twelve federally recognized tribes in Michigan." ITCM, Michigan Inter-Tribal Council (July 19, 2001), available
at http://www.itcmi.org/thehistorytriball l.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2004). The member tribes are as follows: the
Bay Mills Chippewa Indian Community, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, the
Hannahville Indian Community, the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi, the Keweenaw Bay Chippewa
Indian Community, the Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, the Little River Bands of
Ottawa Indians, the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Potawatomi (Gun Lake Tribe), the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians (Potawatomi Indian Nation of Michigan
and Indiana), the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe, and the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians. See
http://www.itcmi.org/thehistorytribal.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2004).
253. The ITCN, founded in 1966, is a nonprofit organization that serves eighteen member reservations and
colonies in Nevada. See http://itcn.org/itcn/itcn.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2004). Its members are as follows: the
Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation, the Duckwater Shoshone Tribe, the Ely Shoshone Tribe, the Fallon
Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, the Fort McDermitt Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, the Lovelock Paiute Tribe, the Moapa Paiute
Band of the Moapa Indian Reservation, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, the Reno Sparks Indian Colony, the
Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation, the Summit Lake Paiute Tribe, the Te-Moak Tribe of
Western Shoshone Indians (which includes the Battle Mountain Band, the Elko Band, the South Fork Band, and
the Wells Band), the Walker River Paiute Tribe, the Washoe Tribe of Nevada and California (which includes the
Carson Community Council, the Dresslerville Community Council, the Stewart Community Council, and the
Woodfords Community Council), the Winnemucca Colony, the Yerington Paiute Tribe Colony and Campbell
Ranch, and the Yomba Shoshone Tribe. See http://itcn.org/tribes/tribes.html (last visited July 12, 2004).
254. The MWTLC serves the following tribes: the Arapaho Business Council, the Blackfeet Tribal business
Council, the Crow Tribal Council, the Fort Belknap Indian Community Council, the Fort Peck Tribal Executive
Board, the Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians of Montana, the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council, the Salish
& Kootenai Tribal Council, the Shoshone Business Council, and the Chippewa Cree Business Committee. See
http://tlc.wtp.net (last visited July 12, 2004).
255. Founded in 1944, NCAI is the largest intertribal organization in the United States. Its membership now
stands at over 250 tribes. Its mission is to "inform the public and the federal government on tribal self-government,
INTERTRIBAL ENFORCEMENT
California Tribal Chairmen's Association (SCTCA),256 and the United South and
Eastern Tribes (USET).257 (This list is by no means exhaustive.) These entities may
prove to be ready-made coalitions for the creation and implementation of intertribal
reciprocity compacts.
Tribal exercise of jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is consistent with the
practices of most, if not all, tribes. Traditionally, Indian tribes have "exercised
authority over members of other tribes who married into the tribe, were adopted into
its families, or otherwise became part of the tribal community voluntarily," as well
as "members of other tribes who voluntarily came to visit or to trade. 258 Indeed,
when enacting the Duro fix, Congress recognized the social bonds between
members of different tribes, the high rates of intertribal marriage, and the fact that
over thirty percent of the population of many reservations consists of nonmember
Indians. 2
9
Intertribal reciprocity compacts are an expression of modem intertribal unity.
They epitomize the "respect and cooperation among governments.. .necessary to
accommodate the limited jurisdictional reach of [each] government[]. ' 2 ° Through
such compacts, tribes can grant to one another the power not only to regulate and
tax nonmember Indians, but the power to enforce against such nonmembers thejudgments and orders of each tribe's courts. In this manner, tribes may circumvent
the restrictions imposed by federal law on their ability to enforce foreign tribal court
orders against nonmember Indians. For example, in the case of Adams and Baker,
if the tribes of which they are members had entered into an intertribal reciprocity
compact, Adams could not evade enforcement of the $1,000,000 judgment against
him by fleeing the jurisdiction of the tribal court that issued the judgment. Rather,
the judgment would be enforceable on Baker's reservation, and on the reservations
of all tribes privy to the reciprocity agreement.
treaty rights, and a broad range of federal policy issues affecting tribal governments." NCAI Official Homepage,
at http://www.ncai.org/index.asp (last visited July 12, 2004).
256. SCTCA is a "multi-service non-profit corporation established in 1972 for a consortium of nineteen
federally recognized Indian tribes in Southern California." Official Homepage of SCTCA, at http://www.sctca.net
(last visited July 12, 2004). Among other things, it administers "numerous grant programs for its members and the
southern California Indian community." Id.
257. The USET includes the following tribes: the Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas, the Aroostook Band
of Micmac Indians, the Catawba Indian Nation, the Cayuga Nation, the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana, the
Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana, the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, the Jena Band of Choctaw Indians, the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, the Mohegan Tribe of Connecticut, the Narragansett Indian Tribe, the Oneida Indian
Nation, the Penobscot Indian Nation and the Passamaquoddy Tribes, the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, the St.
Regis Band of Mohawk Indians, the Seneca Nation of Indians, the Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana, and the
Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah). See http://usetinc.org/defaultpage.cfm?lD=l 8 (last visited July 12,
2004).
258. The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1991) (statement of Richard Collins, law faculty,
University of Colorado).
259. H.R. Rep. 102-61, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N., 370, 373; see also id. at 372 ("[T]ribal governments afford a
broad array of rights and privileges to non-tribal members. Non-tribal member Indians own property on Indian
reservations, their children attend tribal schools, their families receive health care from tribal hospitals and clinics.").
260. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 1, at 267.
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Cross-jurisdiction enforcement of judgments may be conducted, at the election
of the compacting tribes, according to the principles of full faith and credit or
comity.2
61
CONCLUSION
Indian tribes, generally believed to stand outside the confines of the Full Faith
Credit Clause and Act, are, with few exceptions, free to recognize and enforce the
judgments of other tribes as they see fit. Most tribes have adopted the flexible
enforcement regime of comity, for it allows them to refuse to enforce foreign orders
that contravene tribal public policy. This makes sense, given the historic independ-
ence of most tribes from one another and the diverse traditions among the 562
federally recognized tribes in this country.
However, as the Supreme Court increasingly confines the reach of tribal
governmental authority to tribal members only, the ability of tribes to enforce the
judgments of other tribal courts is increasingly called into question. The power of
Congress to remedy the divestiture of tribal authority is limited. Indeed, the
obstacles to tribal enforcement of foreign judgments against nonmembers, including
non-Indians and nonmember Indians, are steep.
Without a fundamental overhaul of federal Indian law, which seems unlikely,
tribes must consider creative alternatives to circumvent the limitations imposed by
the Court on their jurisdiction over nonmembers. Among these alternatives are the
creation of intertribal governing bodies, where appropriate, and the negotiation of
intertribal compacts providing for the reciprocal enforcement of tribal court orders
based on the principles of comity. Admittedly, these suggestions are partial and
incomplete. They provide a basis for reestablishing jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians, but they do not help tribes reestablish jurisdiction over non-Indians. Yet,
by uniting in these ways, and contorting to accommodate the Court's current
jurisprudence, tribes can begin to expand their power and undo the deleterious
effects of colonization.
261. There are numerous models among the states, including the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, in which each state implementing the Act has agreed to extend full faith and credit to child
custody orders entered by other implementing states. See Official Homepage of National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, at http://www.nccusl.org (Final Acts and Legislation) (last visited Sept.
5, 2004).
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